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ABSTRACT 
The U.S. electric power industry has been going through fundamental restructuring 
and realignment since the 1990’s. Many issues and problems have emerged during the 
transition, and both economists and engineers have been looking for the solutions fervently. 
In this dissertation, which consists primarily of three essays, we apply economics theory and 
techniques to the power industry and address two related issues, transmission investment and 
financial transmission rights (FTRs). The first essay takes the decentralized perspective and 
investigates the efficiency attribute of market-based transmission investment under perfect 
competition. We clarify, for the first time, the nature of the externality created by loop flows 
that causes transmission investment to be inefficient. Our findings have important 
implications for better understanding of transmission market design and creating incentives 
for efficient transmission investment.  In the second essay, we define several rules for 
allocating transmission investment cost within the framework of cooperative game theory. 
These rules provide fair, stable or efficient cost allocations in theory and are good 
benchmarks against which the allocation mechanism in practice can be compared and 
improved upon. In the last essay, we make exploratory efforts in analyzing and assessing 
empirically the performance of the Midwest independent system operator (MISO) FTR 
auction market. We reveal some stylized facts about this young market and find that it is not 
efficient under the risk-neutrality assumption. We also point out and correct the drawbacks in 
previous related work and suggest about more complete empirical work in future. In all, this 
dissertation makes both theoretic and empirical analysis of the two hot issues related to the 
power industry and comes up with findings that have important implications for the 
development of this industry.  
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CHAPTER 1.  OVERVIEW 
The contribution of electric power to modern life is unparalleled in the U.S. and 
almost all the other countries in the world. Electricity is pervasive in our society, permeating 
every aspect of the economy and affecting our daily lives both in business and at home. We 
depend on extraordinarily high reliability in electricity services. Interruptions are limited to 
no more than a few hours per year and have far-reaching consequences when they occur.  
This dependence on electricity is starkly evident as we recall the blackout in the 
eastern part of North America in the summer of 2003. The costs are estimated in billions of 
dollars and still have not been fully figured out. This event underscores the extreme 
importance of electricity reliability and the unsubstitutable role that electricity plays in the 
economy and people’s lives. As a response to the electricity failure, public commissions, 
regulatory bodies, and federal and state agencies have undertaken fervent activities to 
identify appropriate actions to prevent such outages in the future.  
Not only are we dependent on electricity, but customers’ expectations of reliability 
have changed. Consumers are demanding very high quality power in their homes for 
electronics and at work for industrial processes. Some industries have indicated that the 
tolerances of their processes require extremely high reliability in electricity supply. Therefore, 
it is of great importance to ensure reliable electricity and transmission services. This is 
highlighted in the context of an unprecedented deregulation of the electric power industry.  
During the past two decades, the way in which electricity is provided to customers 
has changed fundamentally in the U.S. The changes do not speak to the physics of electricity 
or to how it is delivered in a physical sense, but they affect the institutions, pricing, reliability 
and regulation of this essential service. Previously, the power industry was one of the most 
heavily regulated in the U.S. It was characteristic of a structure dominated by vertically 
integrated utilities, regulated primarily at the state level. That is, the functions of generation, 
transmission, and distribution were responsibilities of a single entity. Restructuring and 
realignment, which started in the early 1990’s has altered the rules that governed control, 
operation, ownership, and regulation of the industry. The traditional integrated utility has 
been disaggregated. Generation is now controlled or owned and operated by private, non-
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regulated companies. Electricity prices, instead of being set by regulators, are determined by 
supply and demand in the market. States have moved away from regulations that set rates for 
electricity and toward oversight of an increasingly deregulated industry. Transmission, 
however, remains regulated as a natural monopoly to ensure open and non-discriminatory 
access, a central component of the competitive electricity market. 
The wholesale electricity market design that is being practiced in different regions in 
the U.S. is the Wholesale Power Market Platform (WPMP) rooted in Hogan (1992). 
California, the Mid-Atlantic States, New England, New York, the Midwest, and the 
Southwest have adopted or implemented this design to some extent. The central idea of the 
proposal is the operation of wholesale power markets by Independent System Operators 
(ISOs) or Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs) using locational marginal pricing to 
price power energy. To be specific, load serving entities (LSEs) and generators submit to the 
ISO bids and offers, respectively, which reflect their supply and demand curves. Then the 
ISO determines the power dispatch and the locational marginal price (LMP) at each node for 
each hour, by solving the security-constrained economic dispatch problem (SCED). Basically, 
the ISO maximizes the total social surplus subject to a set of constraints.  
In this dissertation, we focus on the U.S. electric power industry and address two 
related issues under hot debate in the transition process: Transmission investment, and 
financial transmission rights (FTRs). People have been looking for or creating incentives for 
encouraging efficient investment in transmission expansion. One of the proposals is that 
FTRs might be able to do this job. 
(1) Transmission investment 
Among the many challenges that need to be overcome in the restructuring process, 
those revolving around transmission expansion and investment have turned out to be the 
most debatable and intractable. Transmission expansion planning is the process of deciding 
how and when to invest in additional transmission facilities. These decisions have significant 
consequences on the reliability and efficiency of the future power system. In addition, they 
usually involve large capital expenditures and complex regulatory processes. Previous to 
deregulation, the necessary coordination between the two highly independent functions, 
namely generation planning and transmission planning was carried out in an intentionally 
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integrated fashion, often involving the same people, targeting the objectives of the 
organization’s management to whom the analysts and decision-makers reported. 
Transmission enhancements that affected multiple utilities were handled through bilateral 
coordination or through well-structured coordinating bodies. The utility paid for transmission 
upgrades and recovered regulatorily approved costs through customer rates. Under 
deregulation, the number of organizations involved in generation planning and transmission 
planning is significantly increased, each with their own objectives. Generation is planned by 
a multiplicity of companies seeking to maximize their individual profits through energy sales, 
while transmission is planned by transmission owners seeking to maximize their profits 
through transmission services, all overseen and coordinated by a centralized authority, 
usually ISO or RTO, seeking to ensure grid reliability and market efficiency. The increased 
number of stake holders requires procedures for coordinating among them the necessary 
analyses, decisions, and financial implications. Besides, it motivates the need for incentives 
so that organizations perceive transmission investment and ownership to be attractive.  
There has been insufficient investment in transmission expansion relative to growing 
demands and generation capacities. Different approaches to attract or incentivize efficient or 
optimal transmission investment have been put forward. They all fall somewhere between the 
two extremes: completely regulated transmission investment and purely market-based 
transmission investment. The consensus has been reached that we can not solely depend on 
markets for optimal transmission investment, and some sort of regulation and supervision is 
necessary, although the extent of centralization versus decentralization in transmission 
investment is still an open question.  
To create incentives for efficient transmission investment, we need to develop an in-
depth understanding of transmission market design, to which this dissertation makes its 
contribution. The literature tends to emphasize that the reasons for necessity of regulation 
mainly lie in market power in wholesale electricity market and natural monopoly in 
transmission market. Admittedly, the existence of these factors does cause market failure in 
power and transmission markets. However, this is true for any other market as well, so does 
not say anything specific to the power industry. Different from most of the existing paper, 
Chapter 2 of this dissertation clarifies the nature of an externality unique to the power 
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industry, which has never been clearly identified before. Due to this externality, market-
based transmission investment may be inefficient. Our finding facilitates understanding of 
transmission market design and has important implication for defining property rights to 
induce efficient transmission investment.  
The externality we find and other reasons mentioned earlier entail regulation and 
overseeing by a central entity on transmission investment. Market itself will not do the right 
job. One of the responsibilities of such an entity should be to allocate transmission 
investment costs when private incentives fail to cover the expenses of socially beneficial 
investment projects. In Chapter 3, we address the situation in which transmission investment 
enhances the social welfare, but does not benefit market participants equally, such that a 
central authority is needed to decide and impose a proper cost allocation among them in 
order to have the investment undertaken. We use the insights of cooperative game theory to 
define several allocation rules. Each rule provides reasonable cost allocations to the 
electricity cost allocation problem in the situation described above and makes a benchmark 
against which the industry practices can be compared.   
Chapters 2 and 3 both address transmission investment, but they take different 
perspectives. Chapter 2, from the decentralized point of view, studies whether transmission 
investment induced by market is optimal. In contrast, Chapter 3 takes a regulatory 
perspective and inquires what needs to be done by a central planner. These two Chapters 
together make a complete analysis concerning the combination of market and regulator in 
transmission expansion investment.  
(2) FTRs 
Transmission rights stand at the center of market design in the restructured power 
industry. The industry searched for many years without success looking for a workable 
system of physical rights that would support decentralized decisions controlling use of the 
grid. In the design built on the centerpiece of a coordinated spot market, physical 
transmission rights or any associated scheduling priority would create perverse incentives 
and conflicts with priority defined by the bids used in a security-constrained dispatch. Since 
physical rights will not work, something different is needed to achieve the same objective in 
providing a compatible definition of transmission rights for a competitive electricity market. 
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Congestion that causes electricity prices to differ across nodes, leads to the interest in 
financial transmission rights (FTRs) used as a hedging tool against congestion and price 
uncertainty. A coordinated wholesale market with LMPs complemented by FTRs is a 
hallmark of market design that works. Now it is a common practice in the U.S. wholesale 
power market for ISO to issue FTRs. An FTR is a financial instrument that entitles the holder 
to compensation for transmission congestion costs that arise when the transmission grid is 
congested. The amount of compensation is based on the differences in the day-ahead LMPs. 
They do not protect market participants from congestion charges related to scheduling power 
in the real-time market or deviating from the day-ahead schedule. Nor do they hedge against 
transmission loss charges. Besides, FTRs are independent of the physical power dispatch. 
The FTR holder has the financial right to the congestion rent between two specified nodes 
regardless of the actual energy deliveries. 
According to the literature, there are four types of FTRs: point-to-point (PTP) 
obligation, PTP option, flowgate (FG) obligation, and FG option (Hogan 2002). An FTR 
obligation entitles its holder to a positive revenue when the day-ahead congestion occurs in 
the direction as defined by the FTR and to a negative revenue (i.e. to a loss) when the day-
ahead congestion occurs in the opposite direction. An FTR option, in contrast, never results 
in negative revenue, because when the congestion happens in the opposite direction, the FTR 
option holder is not obligated to pay. Therefore, other things being equal, the FTR option has 
a higher value than that of the obligation.  
Up to now, FTRs have been widely used in major U.S. wholesale electricity markets, 
such as the Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Maryland (PJM), New York and California 
markets. Some empirical work has been done on those relatively mature markets to evaluate 
the efficiency of FTR market and test the validity of the underlying theory. The main finding 
is the inefficiency in FTR market practice. More recently, in April 2005 the Midwest ISO 
(MISO) kicked off its wholesale electricity market together with the FTR market. Little effort, 
however, has been made to analyze the performance of this new FTR market. Data 
availability is one of the reasons for scarcity of such studies. In Chapter 4, we take the 
initiative in analyzing this transient market theoretically and empirically. Using the data of 
LMPs and MISO monthly FTR auction results in the one-year period April 2005-March 2006, 
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we assess the performance of the MISO FTR market so far. At the same time, we point out 
the flaws in previous empirical studies on FTR markets. The limited data make it impossible 
to make complete analysis or reach definite conclusions and we have to make some 
simplifying assumption in our studies. But to address this problem, we indicate what data 
will be needed for further studies.  
Chapter 4 is related to the preceding two chapters, as FTRs, apart from being a 
hedging instrument, have also been argued to be potential, effective incentives for 
transmission expansion. Whether or not FTR markets work well in practice affects the 
possibility of using FTRs for transmission investment incentives. 
Here is the outline of the dissertation. In the current chapter, we provide some 
background information of our research. Chapter 2 investigates the efficiency attributes of 
market-based transmission investment and clarifies the nature of the externality created by 
loop flows that can cause inefficient transmission investment. We study the allocation of 
transmission investment cost and propose several cost allocation rules within the framework 
of cooperative game theory in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, we analyze FTRs and the MISO FTR 
market and evaluate its performance and efficiency. The main conclusions from Chapters 2-4 
are summarized in the final chapter.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
7
CHAPTER 2.  MARKET-BASED TRANSMISSION 
INVESTMENT UNDER PERFECT COMPETITION:  IS IT 
EFFICIENT? 
2.1  Introduction 
Since the 1990's, the U.S. power industry has been going through a fundamental 
restructuring from heavy regulation to competition. Transmission networks play a critical 
role in providing access to all participants in a competitive market for supply and delivery of 
electric power. A more robust transmission system would bring in competitive bidders from 
far away and eliminate the chance of dominant generators exercising market power due to 
transmission constraints. Reality is that investment in transmission expansions has been 
insufficient relative to the needs for expanding generation capacity and growing demand. 
Lack of transmission investment limits our ability to maintain or improve electric reliability, 
accommodate growing loads and incorporate higher generation capacities. It is necessary and 
urgent to develop a transmission network that enhances efficiency of a competitive market. 
To do that, we need to find solutions with regard to signals and incentives for encouraging 
efficient investments in transmission expansion. 
Power generation and electricity marketing are generally considered to be areas in 
which competition might work and deregulation has taken place. Transmission, in contrast, is 
still natural monopoly and a limited amount of merchant transmission investment has been 
forthcoming to date in electricity markets where it is permitted and encouraged (Joskow and 
Tirole (2004)). There has been an intense debate regarding the best way to attract or 
incentivize investment in transmission and different approaches have been proposed. Some 
take a more decentralized manner and argue for merchant or market-based transmission 
investment. The other, from a more centralized point of view, emphasizes the importance of 
regulation in transmission investment. Hogan (1992) proposes a contract network pricing 
model, using congestion payments as the rental fee for use of the capacity rights. Within this 
contract network regime, Bushnell and Stoft analyze the potential of "transmission 
congestion contracts (TCCs)" being an incentive for grid investment. In Bushnell and Stoft 
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(1996a), they show that under certain conditions the contract network approach can 
effectively deter detrimental investments. They formalize a rule for allocating TCCs to those 
who provide grid improvements that might allow a decentralized, profit-driven market to 
carry out efficiently the difficult function of grid modifications. Following these, Bushnell 
and Stoft (1997) outline a process by which transmission planning and investment would be 
undertaken by competitive entities in a lightly regulated environment and analyze how the 
network externalities can be managed successfully by the system proposed. The analyses in 
those papers arguing for market-based transmission investment are mainly based on 
assumptions equivalent to the ones of a model of perfect competition. In a recent paper, 
Joskow and Tirole (2005) points out that those assumptions exclude several attributes of 
power markets and transmission networks, such as market power in wholesale electricity 
markets, lumpiness in transmission investment opportunities and stochastic attributes of 
transmission networks, etc. The authors conclude that without the perfect competition 
assumptions, inefficiencies may result from reliance on the merchant transmission 
investment framework. Gans and King (1999) find that current options of market-driven 
investment are unlikely to be adequate in terms of encouraging socially optimal levels and 
timing of new transmission investment. As an alternative, they propose a regulatory scheme 
to overcome that problem. Shang and Volij (2004) address cost allocation of transmission 
investment from the perspective of cooperative game theory. They identify the situation 
where transmission investment will benefit society as a whole, but not every market 
participant. In this case, no coalition is prepared to undertake the investment and a regulatory 
decision to approve the investment and allocate the costs is required. Leautier (2000), Grande 
and Wangesteen (2000) and Vogelsang (2001) focus on the design of economic regulatory 
mechanism for Transcos. The main idea is that an incentive-compatible regulatory 
mechanism for a Transco must provide incentives to the regulated firm to make efficient 
investment decisions, and must also permit it to earn enough revenues to cover its cost. 
Although the extent of regulation versus deregulation in transmission investments is still 
under hot debate, it is now agreed that we can not solely count on market for such 
investments and that regulation is needed to achieve efficient investment. Hogan (1999) 
emphasizes that with TCCs to allocate transmission benefits, it would be possible to rely 
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more on market forces, partly if not completely, to derive transmission expansion. Hogan 
(2002b) generalizes Bushnell and Stoft's analysis and makes a preliminary attempt to 
analytically provide some axioms to properly define LT FTRs (long-term financial 
transmission rights)1. He declares that reliance on merchant investments may not cover all 
cases, but it could provide an efficiency improving complement to regulated, rate-based 
transmission investment. The main approaches of attracting investment in the long-run 
transmission expansion are discussed in Rosellon (2003). 
So far, the most often cited reason for the necessity of regulation in transmission 
investment is that market power in the electricity and transmission markets will cause market 
failure. As mentioned just now, Joskow and Tirole (2005) claim that due to the attributes 
such as market power and economies of scale, market-based transmission investment may 
result in inefficiency. However, the existence of those attributes can lead to market failure in 
any market. They are neither special to nor inherent in the power market. If they were the 
only cause for transmission investment inefficiency, there would be no need to single out the 
power industry for intensive research, and we could simply borrow the recipe from the other 
industries. What is of greater significance, actually, is something inherent in or unique to 
power transmission, if there is any. Knowing them help us understand power transmission 
market design principles better and find solutions to incentivizing efficient transmission 
investment. In this paper, we identify and address one such thing that should be given more 
notice. 
It is well known that generation of power can be efficiently decentralized by means of 
a price system and competitive markets. Indeed, Chao and Peck (1996) show that for a fixed 
grid, a competitive equilibrium is efficient. In other words, the equilibrium nodal and 
transmission prices induce an efficient dispatch. It is also known that this result breaks down 
as soon as the grid itself is endogenous (Bushnell and Stoft (1996a, 1997)). That is, there is a 
market failure in the power market once investment in transmission is allowed. The alleged 
reason for this market failure is the externalities created by loop flows2. That loop flows are 
responsible for the market failure in transmission investment is clear, since a power market 
                                                 
1 FTRs and TCCs are the same thing under different names 
2 There are externalities when the actions of one agent directly affect the payoff of another agent associated with a fixed 
action. 
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with endogenous investment in a radial network can be efficiently decentralized through a 
market mechanism3. However, the nature of the externalities created by loop flows has, to 
the best of our knowledge, never been identified. In most papers, these externalities are either 
taken for granted or addressed ambiguously. Only Chao and Peck (1996) touches the brink 
by mentioning that "new investments in transmission capacity are likely to change the 
physical characteristics (e.g. impedances) of the existing network, raising the issue of 
investment externality", but fails to go further into the problem. 
Is the addition or removal of transmission circuits necessary for markets to fail? In 
other words, if we only allow investment that results in an upgrade of the line capacities of a 
given grid, will a competitive equilibrium allocation fail to be efficient? Are the externalities 
created by loop flows due to the fact that the allowable injections at one node depend on the 
injections at the other nodes? Or are they related to the fact that changes in line capacities 
affect the set of feasible injections into the grid? Does the existence of loop flows result in 
externalities for sure? These questions need to be answered in order to understand how loop 
flows create externalities that cause the market failure with endogenous transmission 
investment. In this paper, using a partial equilibrium approach, we clarify the nature of the 
externalities associated with loop flows that cause transmission investment to be inefficient. 
The bottom line is that transmission investment introduces an externality only if it affects the 
flow of power along the lines for any given set of net injections. For instance, the addition or 
removal of a new circuit will affect the flow of power for any given set of net injections, 
unless of course we are adding or removing part of a radial network. But the increase of the 
operational capacity of a line will not introduce an externality, even if it does change the set 
of feasible injections, unless it also affects the flow of power for any given set of injections. 
From the engineering perspective, there are two options for expanding transmission: 
(1) build new transmission circuits or upgrade old ones and (2) introduce additional control 
capability. Investments in transmission expansion include building new transmission circuits, 
upgrading old and introduce additional control capability. In this paper, we consider 
transmission investments in both options. Although both will continue to exist as options, (1) 
has and will become less and less viable. As a result, there is significantly increased potential 
                                                 
3 A radial network refers to a network with no closed loop. 
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for application of additional power system control in order to strengthen and expand 
transmission in the face of growing transmission usage. However, there has been little effort 
towards planning transmission in the sense of this option, yet the ability to consider it in the 
planning process is a clear need to the industry. In this paper we make steps forward in the 
economic analysis of placing control. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 is a brief introduction of 
physics fundamentals in power transmission. In section 2.3, we formulate and solve the 
general model with endogenous transmission investment for a fixed grid topology. Sections 
2.4 and 2.5, each give an analytical example of transmission investments in building new 
lines and in placing control, respectively, as an application of the model in section 2.3. Grid 
expansion is studied through a numerical example in section 2.6. The conclusions and 
implications are summarized in the last section. 
2.2  Basics of Power Flow Model 
This section addresses some technical issues related to electric power transmission, 
which are part of our economic model. We employ a simplified power system model as an 
approximation to the AC (alternate current) system, leaving out some aspects such as reactive 
power and line losses. 
2.2.1 Real Power Flow 
Every AC electrical network has both real and reactive power flows. The sinusoidal 
pattern of instantaneous power flow produces a complex power representation with real and 
imaginary parts that correspond to real and reactive power, respectively. In this paper, we 
only consider real power. 
Consider a transmission network consisting of a set of nodes or buses { }NN ,...,1=  
and a set of links { }LL ,...,1= . Each link L∈l represents a transmission line connecting two 
nodes in N through which power can flow4. Not all pairs of nodes need to be connected 
transmission lines. A line connecting nodes i and j is characterized by its impedance denoted 
                                                 
4 By impedance, we mean reactance, the imaginary part of impedance. There may be more than one line between a certain 
pair of nodes. Here we treat them as one line or, by another name one corridor connecting the two nodes. 
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by ijZ
5. We have jiij ZZ = . For each node Nn∈ , let nx denote the net power injection at n. In 
a lossless network, the power injections add up to zero: 0
1
=∑
=
N
n
nx , and thus knowledge of the 
net injections in all but one of the nodes is enough to know the net injection in the remaining 
node. In what follows, we will choose node N to be the residual node (or reference node), and 
express the dispatches in terms of the other N-1 nodes. For each pair of connected nodes ( )ji, , 
let jif → be the flow from i to j through the connecting line. Appendix 1 shows that under 
some certain assumptions, these flows can be written as a linear combination of the net 
injections. Specifically, there are unique coefficients ijnα , Nn∈ , such that for any 
dispatch ( )Nxx ,...,1  the flow from i to j can be written as: 
∑−
=
→ ==
1
1
,...,1,  ,
N
n
n
ij
nji Njixf α                                            (1) 
The coefficients ijnα are known as “distribution” or “shift” factors, interpreted as the 
proportion of the power injected at node n that goes from i to j through the connecting line, 
given node N as the reference node. Note that depending on the dispatch ( )Nxx ,...,1 , jif →  can 
be positive or negative, and that since n
ji
nijji xff α==− →→ , we have ijnjin αα −= . We will 
sometimes want to talk about the flow along line l connecting nodes i and j, 
wit hout specifying the direction. This flow will be denoted
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧== ∑∑ −
=
−
=
1
1
1
1
,max
N
n
n
ji
n
N
n
n
ij
nnn xxxf ααα ll . Accordingly, lnα  is the proportion of each unit of 
power injected in n that goes in the “positive” direction of line l .  
 In general, the values of the distribution factors depend on the impedances. Given a 
grid, ijnα are known constants, since ijZ are fixed. For a radial network, however, the 
distribution factors only take the values of 0, 1 or -1, independent of the line impedances. 
That is, for each unit of power injected at one node and withdrawn at another, the lines that it 
                                                 
5 If there are several lines joining i and j, jiZ , the total impedance of the corridor ij equals one over the sum of the 
reciprocals of the individual lines’ impedances. If there is no such line, ∞=jiZ .  
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transits have distribution factors 1 or -1 and the lines it does not go through have the 
distribution factor 0.  
2.2.2 Flow Constraints 
The line flows need to satisfy several constraints. Each transmission line has a 
maximum acceptable flow, called capacity. It is usually determined by the minimum of the 
thermal limit, voltage limit and stability limit of the line. Exceeding the capacity can cause 
physical damage to the transmission line, with subsequent high probability of power failure. 
So the following capacity constraint must be satisfied for each line 
ll kf ≤                                                                     (2) 
Where lk is line l ’s capacity. 
Another set of constraints are called contingency constraints. Sometimes, one or more 
of the transmission lines may be out of work in a contingency. This changes the network and 
leads to a new set of line flows that may no longer meet the capacity limits in (2). For 
operational security, additional restrictions are imposed on the pre-contingency line flows so 
that the post-contingency network flows also satisfy the capacity constraints. These 
additional constraints are nothing more than capacity constraints in a contingency, but they 
constrain the network all the time, not only when a contingency does occur. We will ignore 
contingency constraints in sections 3 and 4 and consider them in section 5. 
2.3  The Model 
In this section, we set up a multi-node power transmission model, using the partial 
equilibrium competitive analysis. In this model, transmission investment is endogenized. The 
purpose is to see if decentralized transmission investment is efficient and why or why not. 
We shall restrict attention to a fixed grid topology, and will comment on the expansion of the 
grid later. 
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2.3.1 Model Specification and Assumptions 
There are two commodities in the economy: power and the numeraire6. The original 
transmission grid consists of N nodes, indexed Nn ,...,1= . Some pairs of nodes are connected 
by transmission lines, and others are not. Let L be the set of existing corridors. In the 
beginning, each corridor, l , has a capacity limit 00 >lk and an impedance 0lZ . For simplicity, 
we assume that all the existing lines of the network are owned by a single transmission owner 
(TO). 
There is a set E of transmission investment firms indexed by Er ∈ . Through 
investment, they increase the transmission capacities of the different corridors, using the 
numeraire as the input. Each investment firm’s technology is given by a production set 
              ( ) ( ){ } ErIICzLIIIzY rLrrrrrLrrr ∈≥∈∀≥−=   ,,..., and  0 :,...,, 11 ll              (3) 
where ( ) ++ →⋅ RRC Lr : is investment firm r’s cost function, which is assumed to be twice 
differentiable and convex, with ( ) 0>⋅∇ rC and ( ) 00 =rC . rI l is the extra transmission 
capacity on corridor l created by transmission investment firm r, and rz is the amount of 
numeraire required as input. The total investment on corridor l  is ∑
∈
=
Er
rII ll . As a result of 
the investment, the total capacity of corridor l becomes lll Ikk += 0 . Investment, while 
enhancing the line capacities, may change the impedances at the same time and in turn affect 
the distribution factors7. We will denote the distribution factors by ( )( )Lvvn I ∈lα to stress their 
dependence on investment. 
Without loss of generality, assume that at each node there is only one consumer and 
one generator, both indexed by the node, Nn ,...,1=  where they are located. Each generator 
produces power using the numeraire according to the following technology: 
( ) ( ){ } NnqCzqqzY nnnnnnn ,...,1  , and 0 :, =≥≥−=  
                                                 
6 Transmission is not directly consumed by the consumers, so we do not view it as a commodity, although there is market for 
it.  
7 Usually when the capacity of a line is enhanced, its impedance will be lower. 
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where ( )nn qC  is generator n’s cost function, which is assumed to be twice differentiable, 
strictly increasing and concave, and satisfies ( ) 00 =nC , nz is the amount of numeraire used 
for production, and nq is the amount of power generated
8. 
Each consumer is endowed with a fixed amount 0>nω of the numeraire and has a 
quasi-linear utility function RRRun →× +:  
( ) ( ) Nncmcmu nnnnnn ,...,1  ,, =+= φ  
where 0≥nc and Rmn ∈ are consumer n’s consumption of power and of the numeraire, 
respectively. As usual, ( )nn cφ is assumed to be bounded above, twice differentiable, strictly 
increasing and strictly concave. The total resources of the economy consist of the aggregate 
endowment of the numeraire, ∑
=
=
N
n
n
1
ωϖ . Assume that the consumer at node n owns a 
share jnθ of the generator located at node j, a share Tnθ of the TO and a share rnθ of investment 
firm r. Clearly, ∑
=
=
N
n
j
n
1
1θ  for all j = 1,…,N, ∑
=
=
N
n
r
n
1
1θ for all Er ∈ , and∑
=
=
N
n
T
n
1
1θ . The 
shares Tnθ and rnθ are closely related to what is referred to in the literature as physical 
transmission rights. 
A dispatch is a vector ( ) NN Rxxx ∈= ,...,1 of net power injections to the grid, one for 
each node such that 0
1
=∑
=
N
n
nx . A dispatch is feasible if it satisfies the following flow 
restrictions, as given in section 2: 
( ) ( )( )∑−
=
∈ ∈+≤=
1
1
0   ,
N
n
nLvvn LIkxIxf lllll α                                     (4) 
2.3.2 Efficient Allocation 
An allocation in this economy is a description of each consumer's consumption plan, 
each generator's production plan and each investment firm's investment plan. Some 
                                                 
8 In the engineering literature, p, instead of q is usually used for the quantity of power. In our paper, we maintain the 
economics convention, using q as the quantity and reserving p for the price. 
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allocations are not feasible. In order to be feasible, an allocation must satisfy the constraints 
imposed by the economy's resources, technology and grid capacity. Formally, 
Definition 1 A feasible allocation ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )ErLrrNnnnNnnn Izqzcm ∈∈== −− ll,,,,, 11 in this economy 
is a specification of a consumption bundle ( ) +×∈ RRcm nn , for each consumer n = 1,…,N, a 
production plan ( ) nnn Yqz ∈− , for each generator n = 1,…,N and an investment plan 
( )( ) rLrr YIz ∈− ∈ll, for each investment firm Er ∈ , such that 
∑ ∑∑
= ∈=
=++
N
n Er
r
n
N
n
n zzm
11
ϖ                                                       (5) 
∑∑
==
=
N
n
n
N
n
n qc
11
                                                                         (6) 
( )( )( )∑−
=
∈ ∈∀+≤−
1
1
0   ,
N
n
nnLvvn LIkcqI llllα                               (7) 
Condition (5) requires that the total amount of the numeraire consumed and used for 
production and investment should be equal to the amount of the numeraire that is available to 
society. Condition (6) dictates that the total generation of the system should satisfy the 
aggregate demand. Condition (7) requires that the flow along each line should satisfy the 
capacity constraint. 
Although there can be many feasible allocations, not all of them are equally attractive. 
We are interested in those feasible allocations that cannot be improved upon. 
Definition 2 A feasible allocation ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )ErLrrNnnnNnnn Izqzcm ∈∈== −− ll **1**1** ,,,,,  is efficient (or 
optimal) if there is no alternative feasible allocation 
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )ErLrrNnnnNnnn Izqzcm ∈∈== −− ll,,,,, 11  such that 
( ) ( ) ,...,Nncmucmu nnnnnn 1  ,,, ** =∀≥  
with strict inequality for at least one agent n. 
This definition states that when the economy is at an efficient allocation, no other 
feasible allocation can make at least one consumer better-off without hurting any of the other 
agents. 
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2.3.3 Characterization of Efficient Allocation 
When consumer preferences are quasi-linear, the optimal allocation must maximize 
the sum of individual utilities. Consider an allocation 
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )ErLrrNnnnNnnn Izqzcm ∈∈== −− ll,,,,, 11 . The total amount of numeraire used as inputs for 
producing power and transmission is ( ) ( )∑ ∑
= ∈
+
N
n Er
r
L
rr
nn IICqC
1
1 ,..., . The leftover to distribute 
among the consumers is ( ) ( )∑ ∑
= ∈
−−
N
n Er
r
L
rr
nn IICqC
1
1 ,...,ϖ . Therefore, given the quasi-linearity 
of the consumers’ preferences, the sum of the utilities can be written 
as ( ) ( ) ( )∑ ∑∑
= ∈=
+−−
N
n Er
r
L
rr
nn
N
n
nn IICqCc
1
1
1
,..., ϖφ . An optimal allocation 
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )ErLrrNnnnNnnn Izqzcm ∈∈== −− ll **1**1** ,,,,,  therefore solves 
( ) ( ) ( )∑ ∑∑
= ∈=∈∈∈
≥
−−
N
n Er
r
L
rr
nn
N
n
nn
ErLNn
Iqc
IICqCc
r
nn 1
1
1,,
0,,
,...,max φ
l l
                                (8) 
s.t. ∑∑
==
=
N
n
n
N
n
n qc
11
 
( )( )( )∑−
=
∈ ∈∀+≤−
1
1
0   ,
N
n
nnLvvn LIkcqI llllα  
That is, an optimal allocation maximizes the aggregate surplus subject to the non-
negativity, balancing and flow constraints. For the sake of analysis, assume that ( )⋅lnα are 
convex functions so that the set of feasible allocations is convex. Let λ and lμ be the 
Lagrangian multipliers of the above constraints, respectively. Then the first order conditions 
for an efficient allocation are 
( ) ( )( )∑
∈
∈ −=∀>−≤∂
∂
L
nLvvnn
n
n NncIc
c l
l
l 1,...,1  ,0 ifequality   with , *** μαλφ  
( ) 0 ifequality   with , ** >≤∂∂ NNNN ccc λ
φ  
( )( ) ( ) 1,...,1  ,0 ifequality   with , *** −=∀>∂∂≤−∑∈ ∈ Nnqqq
CI nn
n
n
L
Lvvn
l
l
l μαλ  
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( ) 0 ifequality   with , ** >∂∂≤ NNNN qqq
Cλ  
( )( )( ) ( ) ErLII
I
Ccq
I
I
Lvvr
r
nn
Lz
N
n
Lvv
z
n
z ∈∈∀>∂
∂≤−∂
∂− ∈
∈
−
=
∈∑ ∑ ,  ,0 ifequality   with , ****1
1
*
ll
ll
l
αμμ
            ∑∑
==
=
N
n
n
N
n
n qc
1
*
1
*  
( )( )( )∑−
=
∈ ∈∀>+≤−
1
1
*0***   ,0 ifequality   with ,
N
n
nnLvvn LIkcqI lllll μα  
Let ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )ErLrrNnnnNnnn Izqzcm ∈∈== −− ll **1**1** ,,,,,  be an efficient allocation. The last two 
equations are the feasibility conditions: aggregate consumption should be equal to aggregate 
power generation, and the resulting dispatch should induce line flows that respect the 
corresponding capacity constraints. The multipliers lμ , for L∈l are the marginal social 
benefit that would result from an increase of one MW in the transmission capacity of linel . 
Equivalently, they are the marginal social cot of having one MW less of capacity available on 
line l . Only if the capacity constraint is binding at the efficient allocation, can this marginal 
social benefit be positive. The multiplier λ is the marginal social benefit of one MW 
consumed at the residual node N, or equivalently the marginal social cost of one MW 
produced at node N. 
The first two sets of conditions require that the private benefit from an additional unit 
of power supplied at node n, for n = 1,…,N, be equal to the social cost of supplying it at that 
node, unless 0* =nc , in which case the private benefit can be lower than the social cost. Here 
the social cost of supplying one MW at node n equals the social cost of supplying one MW at 
the residual node, λ , plus the social cost of transmitting it to node n, which is given 
by ( )( )∑
∈
∈−
L
Lvvn I
l
l
l μα * . 
To see this, note that ( )( )Lvvn I ∈*lα  is the fraction of each MW injected at node n that 
goes through line l in the “positive” direction. The social cost of transmitting this fraction 
along this line is ( )( ) ll μα Lvvn I ∈* . As a result, the cost of transmitting one MW from node n to 
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node N is ( )( )∑
∈
∈
L
Lvvn I
l
l
l μα * . Consequently, the social cost of transmitting one MW in the 
opposite direction, namely from N to n, is ( )( )∑
∈
∈−
L
Lvvn I
l
l
l μα * .  
The second two sets of equations necessitate that the private cost of generation of one 
MW at each node n, should be equal to the social cost of an additional MW at that node, 
unless 0* =nq , in which case the private cost can be greater than the social cost. As explained 
earlier, the social cost of an additional MW at node n is ( )( )∑
∈
∈−
L
Lvvn I
l
l
l μαλ * .  
Lastly, the third set of equations demand that the marginal private costs of investing 
in capacity of line l be equal to the social benefit of that investment, unless 0* =lI , in which 
case the private cost of the investment can be greater than the social benefit. This social 
benefit has two components. One is the social benefit of the increased capacity of the line, 
which is lμ . The other is the social cost that results from the change in the distribution factors 
that is caused by the investment on line l . To calculate this social cost, note that the 
investment causes the distribution factors to change at a rate of
( )( )
lI
I Lvv
z
n
∂
∂ ∈*α . Given that the 
injection at node n is ** nn cq − , this means that the flow along line z due to this injection 
increases by 
( )( )( )*** nnLvvzn cqII −∂∂ ∈l
α
, which amounts to saying that the given injection requires 
more of the capacity of line l . Therefore, the social cost of this required capacity is 
( )( )( )*** nnLvvznz cqII −∂∂ ∈l
αμ . As a result, the total social cost that results from the change in the 
distribution factors induced by the investment in line l is given by 
( )( )( )**1
1
*
nn
Lz
N
n
Lvv
z
n
z cqI
I −∂
∂∑ ∑
∈
−
=
∈
l
αμ .  
2.3.4 Competitive Equilibrium 
Now that we have a characterization of the efficient allocation, we can ask how to 
implement it. One alternative would be to impose it by a central planner. This entity knows 
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what the efficient allocation is and can, in principle, dictate the optimal generation levels to 
the generators and the optimal capacitor-induced capacity enhancement to the investment 
firm. In reality, however, trying to impose an allocation on the different players may be an 
impossible task. One would have to know the cost structure of every generator and of the 
investment firms, and more importantly, one would have to possess the power to impose on 
them the optimal generation and investment levels. Another alternative would be to 
decentralize the decisions by means of a price system and competitive markets. The idea of 
such a price system is to allow the generators and investment firms to decide for themselves 
the generation and investment levels, respectively, taking electricity prices and transmission 
charges as given. The objective is still the same, but the huge task of determining the optimal 
allocation is now subdivided into many small tasks, each performed by an economic agent. 
Nobody needs to know the technology or cost structure of all the firms. It is enough for each 
firm to know its own cost function. Similarly, it is not needed for any omniscient central 
planner to figure out the optimal allocation. Each agent will try to maximize her own profit 
or utility given the market prices. Presumably, the agents will decide what is best for them, 
but if the prices are right, these prices will induce the agents to choose the quantities that 
correspond to the efficient allocation. 
We now describe a competitive equilibrium. In the equilibrium, there will be 
electricity prices np associated with each node (the nodal prices) n = 1,…,N and transmission 
price lt for each corridor L∈l . The price of the numeraire is normalized to unity. Each 
generator decides how much electricity to produce in response to its own nodal price and 
each consumer decides how much electricity to consume in response to her own nodal price. 
Given all the nodal prices and transmission prices, each investment firm chooses how much 
extra capacity to build through transmission investment. After the investment, the 
transmission investment firms become the owners of the newly produced capacities. In order 
for the nodal and transmission prices ( ) ( ) LNnn tp ∈= ll,1 to be in equilibrium, they must satisfy a 
no-arbitrage condition. Specifically, it must be impossible for any individual to make a 
positive profit by buying power at a given node and selling it at a different node at the 
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corresponding nodal prices after paying the transmission charge induced by this transaction. 
We define a competitive equilibrium as follows. 
Definition 3 An allocation ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )ErLrrNnnnNnnn Izqzcm ∈∈== −− ll **1**1** ,,,,,  and a price vector 
( ) ( ) ( )( )LNnn tptp ∈== ll,, 1  constitute a competitive equilibrium if the following conditions are 
satisfied: 
1. Generators’ profit maximization: For each generator n = 1,…,N, ( ) nnn Yqz ∈− ** ,  satisfies 
( ) nnnnnnnnn Yqzzqpzqp ∈−∀−≥− ,  ,**  
2. Investment firms’ profit maximization: For each investment firm Er ∈ , 
( )( ) rLrr YIz ∈− ∈ll ** , satisfies 
( )( )∑∑
∈
∈
∈
∈−∀−≥−
L
r
L
rrrr
L
rr YIzzItzIt
l
llll
l
ll ,  ,
**  
3. Utility maximization: For each consumer n = 1,…,N, ( )** , nn cm solves 
( ) ( )nnnRRcm cmnn φ++×∈,max  
s.t. ( )∑ ∑∑ ∑
= ∈∈ ∈
+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+−+≤+
N
j L
T
n
Er L
rrr
njjj
j
nnnnn ktzItzqpcpm
1
0****
l
ll
l
ll θθθω  
4. No arbitrage: for any dispatch ( ) NN Rxx ∈,...,1 such that∑
=
=
N
n
nx
1
0  
( )( )∑ ∑ ∑
= ∈ =
∈ ≥+
N
n L
N
n
nLvvnnn xItxp
1 1
* 0
l
l
l α                                              (9) 
5. Market clearing:  
ϖ=++ ∑∑∑
∈== Ez
r
N
n
n
N
n
n zzm
*
1
*
1
*                                                                   (10) 
∑∑
==
=
N
n
n
N
n
n qc
1
*
1
*                                                                                       (11) 
( )( )( )∑−
=
∈ ∈∀>+≤−
1
1
*0***   ,0 ifequality   with ,
N
n
nnLvvn LtIkcqI lllllα      (12) 
The first two conditions state that generators and transmission investment firms 
choose production and investment plans that maximize their profits, given the competitive 
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prices. The third condition states that consumers maximize their profits given their budget 
constraints. Condition 4 is the no-arbitrage condition; it should be impossible to find a 
dispatch that yields positive profits. Condition 5 dictates that in a competitive equilibrium 
market must clear for each good: the numeraire, power and transmission, respectively. (11) 
actually requires that the total amount of power consumed is equal to the total amount of 
power produced. (12) says that in equilibrium the price of transmission on a line is positive 
only when the demand for transmission equals the supply of transmission on that line9. 
Alternatively, the transmission price is zero when there is excess capacity. 
2.3.5 Characterization of Competitive Equilibrium 
Now let us characterize the five conditions in the above definition. Condition 1 says 
that each generator maximizes its profit, given its own technology and nodal price: formally, 
it chooses *nq , so as to solve: 
( )nnnnq qCqpn −≥0max  
Given our assumptions on the cost function, the necessary and sufficient conditions for *nq to 
solve the above problem are 
( ) Nnq
q
qCp n
n
nn
n ,...,1 ,0 ifequality   with ,
*
*
=∀>∂
∂≤                          (13) 
In condition 2, each investment firm maximizes its profit, taking as given the transmission 
price on each line and its own technology: it chooses ( )**1 ,..., rLr II which solves: 
( )∑
∈∈∀
−
L
r
L
rrr
LI
IICIt
r
l
llll
,...,max 1
,
 
The corresponding necessary and sufficient conditions are 
    ( ) ErIII
I
Ct rrrr
r
∈∀>∂
∂≤  ,0 ifequality  with ,,..., ***1 ll
l
l                      (14) 
Condition 3 in the definition states that each consumer maximizes her utility, in 
response to the nodal price at her own node: she solves the problem 
                                                 
9 That is, when the line is congested. 
  
23
( ) ( )nnnRRcm cmnn φ++×∈,max  
s.t. nnnn wcpm ≤+  
where ( )( ) ( ) ∑∑ ∑ ∑
∈= ∈ ∈
+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+−+=
L
T
n
N
j Er L
rrrr
njjjn
j
nnn ktICItqCqpw
l
ll
l
lll
0
1
**** θθθω is consumer n’s 
wealth. Given our assumptions about the utility functions, the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for a utility maximizing bundle are 
( ) Nncp
c
c
nn
n
nn ,...,1 ,0 ifequality   with , *
*
=∀>≤∂
∂φ
                         (15) 
As for the no-arbitrage condition 4, we will show that a necessary and sufficient 
condition for it to hold is that the price at the residual node N be equal to the nodal price at 
each node n=1,…,N-1 plus the charge that results from the transmission of one unit of power 
from node n to node N. Formally, condition (9) is equivalent to 
( )( )∑
∈
∈ −=∀+=
L
LvvnnN NnItpp
l
l
l 1,...,1  ,
*α                                    (16) 
To see that this condition is necessary, note that (9) should be satisfied with equality, since 
if ( )Nxx ,...,1 is a feasible dispatch, so is ( )Nxx −− ,...,1 . Therefore, 
( )( )∑∑
∈
∈
=
=+
L
nLvvn
N
n
nn xItxp
l
l
l 0
*
1
α  
Taking 1=Nx , 1−=mx , and 0=kx , for Nnk ,≠ , and rearranging it we get condition (16). 
To see that this condition is also sufficient, note that if (16) holds for  n=1,…,N-1, then we 
have that for any feasible dispatch ( )Nxx ,...,1  
( )( )∑
∈
∈ −=∀+=
L
nLvvnnnnN NnxItxpxp
l
l
l 1,...,1  ,
*α  
Adding over 1,...,1 −= Nn  we get 
( )( )∑∑∑∑ −
= ∈
∈
−
=
−
=
+=
1
1
*
1
1
1
1
N
n L
nLvvn
N
n
nn
N
n
nN xItxpxp
l
l
lα  
which, given that ∑−
=
−=
1
1
N
n
nN xx implies the no arbitrage condition (9).  
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The last condition says that at the equilibrium prices, supply equals demand for the 
numeraire, power and transmission, respectively. In all, conditions (10) through (15) must 
be satisfied in a competitive equilibrium.  
To summarize, the necessary and sufficient conditions for allocation 
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )ErLrrNnnnNnnn Izqzcm ∈∈== −− ll **1**1** ,,,,,  and price vector ( ) ( ) ( )( )LNnn tptp ∈== ll,, 1  to be a 
competitive equilibrium are 
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n ,...,1 ,0 ifequality   with ,
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∂≤                                 (17) 
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2.3.6 Comparison between Competitive Equilibrium and Efficient 
Allocation 
So far, we have derived the conditions for both the competitive equilibrium and 
efficient allocation. Now comes the question we are interested in: is the market outcome 
socially efficient? Or equivalently, can the efficient allocation be decentralized? To answer 
the question, we need to compare the two sets of conditions. 
The main observation we can make is that if for each lines, L∈',ll , and for each 
node Nn∈ , investment in line l does not affect the distribution factor 'lnα , that is, if 
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( )( )
0
*
=∂
∂ ∈
lI
I Lvv
z
nα , then every efficient allocation can be decentralized by competitive prices, 
and every competitive allocation is efficient. Indeed, it is easy to see that ifλ and ( ) L∈llμ are 
the Lagrangian multipliers that, together with ( ) ( )( ),,*1** ,, LErrNnnn Iqc ∈∈= ll solve the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for an efficient allocation, then λ=Np , ∑
∈
−=
L
nnp
l
l
lμαλ for 
1,...,1 −= Nn , and ll μ=t , for L∈l  are the nodal and transmission prices that support the 
corresponding efficient allocation. And conversely, if ( ) ( )( )LNnn tp ∈= ll,1 are competitive 
equilibrium prices that together with ( ) ( )( ),,*1** ,, LErrNnnn Iqc ∈∈= ll  solve the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for a competitive equilibrium, then Np=λ , and ll t=μ , together with 
( ) ( )( ),,*1** ,, LErrNnnn Iqc ∈∈= ll  satisfy the necessary and sufficient conditions for an efficient 
allocation.  
In general, however, the distribution factors
'l
nα are affected by the investment in the 
different lines. That is, transmission investment usually changes the flow of power along the 
lines for a given set of injections. This externality is the root cause of the inefficiency of the 
competitive allocations, and of the fact that efficient allocation cannot be decentralized by 
means of competitive prices. Suppose the transmission investment in line l enhances 'lnα for 
some line L∈'l . Without loss of generality, let us assume that 0' >lnα . Then for each unit of 
power injected at n, a larger proportion will transit line 'l  as a result of the investment. Recall 
that nx , the net power injection at node n can be positive or negative. Someone who injects 
nx at n will have to pay nn x
'lα times the corresponding transmission price for using line 'l . 
Suppose that line 'l is congested, so that its transmission price is positive. Then if 0>nx , the 
injector will need to make a positive payment; if 0<nx , the injector (or actually the ejector 
in this case) will pay a negative amount. Since
'l
nα increases after the investment, the 
congestion payment will be higher than before for 0>nx and lower than before for 0<nx . So, 
the transmission investment creates a negative externality towards those who inject power at 
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node n and a positive externality for those who eject power at n. Clearly, this externality is 
relevant only if the line is congested. The transmission investment in one linel may change 
the distribution factors of several lines in the network and have an externality on each of the 
affected lines. The sum of the values of all these externalities is the total effect caused by the 
investment on line l , indicated by the expression ( )( )( )**1
1
*
nn
Lz
N
n
Lvv
z
n
z cqI
I −∂
∂∑ ∑
∈
−
=
∈
l
αμ . As this 
effect is not taken into account by the competitive prices, one would expect competitive 
markets to result in under- or over-investment in transmission. One way to restore efficiency 
is to impose a unit tax of
( )( )( )**1
1
*
nn
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n
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z
n
z cqI
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∈
−
=
∈
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l
αμτ or equivalently a subsidy of 
( )( )( )**1
1
*
nn
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s −∂
∂−= ∑ ∑
∈
−
=
∈
l
l
αμ on investment in line l . 
Recall that in a radial network the distribution factors are constants of 1, -1 or 0, 
independent of the line impedances. As long as the radial grid topology is not changed by the 
transmission investment, the distribution factors will remain the same. And there will be no 
investment externality. Consider the network in figure 1. If new transmission lines are built 
between nodes 1 and 3 or between 2 and 3, the grid topology will not change and the 
distribution factors will be the same as before regardless of the newly created capacities. In 
that case, 
( )( )
0
*
=∂
∂ ∈
lI
I Lvv
z
nα , for all 2,1 , =zl and 3,2,1=n and the investment in equilibrium 
will be efficient. If new lines are built between nodes 1 and 2, the grid topology will be 
changed and the network will become a meshed one. We will leave this case for discussion in 
the following subsection.  
Now it is clear that the externalities that cause endogenous transmission investment to 
be inefficient are created by loop flows and there is no externality with radial networks.  But, 
the existence of loop flows does not necessarily cause externalities. It does only when 
transmission investment changes the distribution factors, thus affects the flow of power on 
the lines for a given set of injections. Otherwise, even in the presence of loop flows, there 
will be no externalities and the investment will be efficient. 
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Figure 1: A radial network 
In conclusion, for endogenous transmission investment, the source of the market 
failure lies in the fact that investment affects the power flow through the lines for any given 
dispatch. Efficiency is never guaranteed as long as transmission investment changes the 
distribution factors, whether in the case of a fixed grid topology or grid expansion. There is 
no externality with a radial network if it is still radial after the investment. Interestingly, here 
the action of an investment firm does not directly affect the other investment firms' 
production possibility sets, the generators' production sets or the consumers' preferences. 
Instead, the investment changes the flow structure of the transmission network, which causes 
inefficiency. Therefore, the externality introduced by transmission investment is different 
from the externality in the usual sense. It arises due to the physical aspects in power 
transmission. 
For application of the model, we will, in the following sections, give two analytical 
examples, one about the capacity enhancement via lines and the other about the capacity 
enhancement via control. The comparison of the two examples makes it even clearer when 
transmission investment introduces an externality, hence results in market failure and when it 
does not. 
2.4 Transmission-induced Capacity Enhancement 
The preceding section formulates the general model with a huge transmission 
network. This section presents a simple three-bus example as an application and illustration 
of the general model. In this example, we consider the specific type of transmission 
investment: building new transmission lines or updating existing ones. Look at the grid in 
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figure 2, where there are 3 interconnected nodes, 3,2,1=n . Let 3,2,1=l index the lines 
connecting nodes 2 and 3, nodes 1 and 3 and nodes 1 and 2, respectively. Originally, each 
line has some capacity. The capacities of line 1 and line 2 are so large that they are never 
congested. Besides, they have the same impedance. Let 0k denote the original capacity of line 
3. To make things interesting, suppose that 0k is less than the socially efficient capacity.  
 
Figure 2: A three-node network 
A generator is attached to nodes 1 and 2, respectively, denoted by 1G and 2G . 1G ’s 
cost function is ( )11 qC and 2G ’s cost function is ( )22 qC , where 1q and 2q are the amount of 
power generated by 1G and 2G , respectively, and ( )⋅nC for 2,1=n are strictly convex functions 
that satisfy ( ) 00 =nC . The only load of a constant D MW is located at node 3. There is an 
investment firm that produces transmission capacity by building or updating transmission 
circuits. It only chooses to build lines between nodes 1 and 2, since the other two lines 
already have enough capacities and the price of new transmission will be zero. The 
investment firm's cost function is ( )IC , where I is the additional capacity created on the 
corridor between nodes 1 and 2. 
At a feasible dispatch ( )21 ,qq , the load must be satisfied, that is Dqq =+ 21 and the 
flow along each line should not exceed the line’s capacity limit. In this example, since we 
assume that lines 1 and 2 have large enough capacities, we are only concerned about the flow 
along line 3. Given the dispatch ( )21 ,qq and newly built capacity I, the flow along line 3 from 
node 1 to node 2 can be written as 
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( )( )2112 qqIf −= α  
Where ( )Iα  is the distribution factor10. Clearly, the flow of power along this line depends on 
the dispatch, and the capacity enhancement on the line. 
A feasible allocation consists of a dispatch ( )21 , qq and a capacity investment I, such 
that ( ) ( )( ) IkqqIIk +≤−≤+− 0210 α . Then the optimal allocation ( )( )**2*1 ,, Iqq of this 
economy can be derived by solving the following problem: 
( ) ( ) ( )ICqCqC
Iqq
++≥ 22110,, 21min                                                  (24) 
s.t. Dqq =+ 21  
       ( ) ( )( ) IkqqIIk +≤−≤+− 0210 α  
Like before, assume that ( )⋅α is such that the set of feasible allocations is convex. Also, 
assume for simplicity that the above problem has an interior solution and, without loss of 
generality, that at that solution ( )( ) 0*2*1* ≥− qqIα 11. Letλ andμ be the Lagrangian multipliers 
of the above constraints, respectively. Then the first order conditions for an interior solution 
are: 
( ) ( )*
1
*
11 I
q
qC μαλ −=∂
∂  
( ) ( )*
2
*
22 I
q
qC μαλ +=∂
∂             
( ) ( )( )*2*1** qqIIIIC −∂∂−=∂∂ αμμ                                        (25) 
Dqq =+ *2*1  
( )( ) *0*2*1* IkqqI +=−α  
Note thatλ is the social cost of satisfying one more MW at node 3 and μ is the marginal 
social benefit from one MW enhancement in the transmission capacity of line 3. The first two 
equations state that at the optimal allocation, the private cost of one more MW generated at 
                                                 
10 Here ααα == 122121 , because line 1 and line 2 have the same impedance.  
11 Sufficient conditions for an interior solution would be that marginal costs of generation and investments are 0 when 
evaluated at 0.  
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node n for 2,1=n  must equal the social cost of one more MW at node n for 2,1=n , which is 
equal to the social cost (λ ) of supplying one more MW at node 3 plus the social cost of 
transmitting it to node n. The third equation dictates that marginal private cost of the 
transmission investment in line 3 be equal to its marginal social benefit. This social benefit 
consists of the social benefit of the capacity enhancement on line 3 less the social cost from 
the change in the flow along that line due to the change in the distribution factor. 
( )( )*2*1* qqII −∂∂α  is the change in the flow on line 3 for a given dispatch, caused by the 
capacity enhancement and reflects the externality introduced by the transmission investment. 
The last two equations are the market-clearing conditions for electricity and transmission. It 
follows that at an interior efficient allocation ( )( ) 0,, **2*1 >>Iqq , 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )**2*11
*
11
2
*
22
*
*
1
2 I
qqq
qC
q
qC
I
I
I
IC
αα −−=∂
∂−∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
                              (26) 
This equation gives the relation between the optimal generations and investment and will be 
used to for comparison between the optimal allocation and the competitive equilibrium. 
Now look at the market outcome. Let t be the transmission price on the newly built 
line. A competitive equilibrium of this economy consists of an allocation ( )( )**2*1 ,, Iqq and a 
price vector ( )tppp ,,, 321 that satisfy the following conditions: 
1. The investment firm maximizes its profits, given t: *I solves 
( )ICtI
I
−
≥0
max                                                                (27) 
2. Each generator maximizes its profit, given its respective nodal price: *nq  for 2,1=n  
solves 
( )nnnnq qCqpn −≥0max                                                         (28) 
3. Markets clear: 
Dqq =+ *2*1  
( )( ) *0*2*1* IkqqI +=−α  
4. No arbitrage opportunity exists: 
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( )tIpp *13 α+=                                                               (29) 
( )tIpp *23 α−=                                                               (30) 
Assume that the investment and production levels are strictly positive in equilibrium. 
Then conditions (27) and (28) can be replaced by the corresponding necessary and sufficient 
conditions for profit maximization as follows: 
( ) t
I
IC =∂
∂ *                                                                        (31) 
( )
2,1  ,
*
==∂
∂ np
q
qC
n
n
nn                                                     (32) 
Equation (31) says that the investment firm will choose the investment level that equalizes its 
marginal cost with the transmission price. Likewise, each generator maximizes its profit by 
having the marginal cost of its generation equal the electricity price at its own node, as 
indicated by each equation in (32). Substituting (32) into (29) and (30), we get 
( ) ( )tI
q
qCp *
1
*
11
3 α+∂
∂=  
( ) ( )tI
q
qCp *
2
*
22
3 α−∂
∂=  
These two equations together with (31) yield 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )**
1
*
11
2
*
22 2 I
I
IC
q
qC
q
qC α∂
∂=∂
∂−∂
∂                                      (33) 
Comparing equations (26) and (33), we can see that unless ( ) 0=∂
∂
I
IC , that is, unless 
investment does not affect the power distribution factorα , we cannot guarantee that the 
competitive equilibrium is efficient. This divergence results from the effect of transmission 
investment on the distribution factor and the flow structure of the network. In the social 
optimality problem, this effect is internalized, while in the market, the investment firm does 
not take it into account. Therefore, the resulting transmission investment may be inefficient 
due to the externality introduced by the new investment12. This result is consistent with that 
                                                 
12 Note that the investment in line 3 also changes the distribution factors of line 2 and line 3. But we do not need to worry 
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derived from the large model in section 3. In spite of the externality, some government 
intervention can still achieve efficiency via a decentralized market mechanism. For example, 
given enough information, we can apply an ad valorem tax rate equal to ( )( )*2*1* qqII −∂∂α . 
This is shown in Appendix 2.  
2.5 Capacitor-induced Capacity Enhancement 
In this section, we will give an example of a different type of transmission investment, 
placing control. A specific control method, adding capacitors is considered here. As a 
capacitor, after being installed, is switched on only in case a contingency, contingency is 
much relevant to this type of capacity enhancement. Therefore, we will need to modify the 
model in section 3 by incorporating the contingency constraints. 
Adding capacitors enhance the capacity of some lines under contingency but does not 
change any capacity under normal conditions. Different from building new lines, this type of 
transmission investment does not affect the line impedances of the network. Hence, the 
power distribution factors under normal conditions and contingency will be the same before 
and after a capacitor is installed. From the results obtained in section 3, we should expect that 
transmission investment via capacitors in equilibrium will be efficient. This is illustrated in 
the following example. 
Consider the 3-node transmission network illustrated in figure 3. Nodes 2 and 3 are 
connected by line 1, nodes 1 and 2, by line 3 and buses 1 and 3, by two lines, line 21 and line 
22. Suppose that line 1 and line 3 have the same impedance and so do line 21 and line 22. 
Further, the impedance of line 1 is half of that of line 21, so that each corridor has the same 
impedance. For simplicity assume that lines 1 and 3 have large enough capacities so that they 
are never congested, whether in the normal conditions or in a contingency. Each of the two 
lines that connect nodes 1 and 3, on the other hand, has a capacity of 1k , determined by the 
voltage or stability limit. 
                                                                                                                                                       
about the flow constraints of those two lines, because they are never congested. 
  
33
 
Figure 3: The three-node network under normal conditions 
In a contingency, line 21, but not any other line will fail. Suppose that a 20% capacity 
pre-reserved for line 22 will be released in the contingency, so that the maximum flow 
allowed through this remaining line when line 21 fails will be 12 2.1 kk = . Capacities 1k  
and 2k should not be interpreted as a "physical limit" on the flow transmitted through the lines 
but as "operational limit" that results from the satisfaction of the disturbance performance 
criteria for the network. The network under the contingency is shown in figure 4. 
 
Figure 4: Contingency with no capacitor 
As in section 4, a generator is attached to nodes 1 and 2, respectively, denoted by 1G  
and 2G . Their cost functions are ( )11 qC and ( )22 qC , respectively and satisfy the bunch of 
assumptions given in the preceding section. At node 3, there is a constant load of D MW. 
There is also an investment firm that can increase the capacity of the network by installing 
capacitors. As mentioned above, a capacitor is a device that is installed at an appropriate 
node and that can be switched on in case of a contingency. When the capacitor is switched on, 
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the maximum acceptable flow on a given line will be enhanced by certain units. Specifically 
for this example, when the capacitor is switched on, the capacity of line 22 will 
become Ik +2 in the contingency, where I is the capacitor-induced capacity enhancement13. 
The magnitude of I is a decision variable of the investment firm. The cost of increasing the 
contingent capacity by I units is given by, C(I), where again, ( )⋅C  has the same properties as 
mentioned earlier . Figure 5 illustrates the network under the contingency when a capacitor is 
installed and switched on. 
 
Figure 5: Contingency with capacitor installed and switched on 
In order to satisfy the load at node 3, the total generation of the system must satisfy 
Dqq =+ 21 . However, not every dispatch ( )21 , qq  is allowable. Only those that induce flows 
on the lines 21 and 22 that respect their capacity constraints are allowed. Given the basic data 
of the network, in normal circumstances the flow through lines 21 and 22 will be given by 
( ) ( ) 2121222121 6
1
3
1,, qqqqfqqf +== . This flow should not exceed the maximum acceptable 
flow of 1k . Similarly, if a contingency occurs, and line 22 becomes the only line that remains 
connecting nodes 1 and 3, the flow through that line will be ( ) 212122 4
1
2
1, qqqqf c += , which 
should be no greater than Ik +2 . The foregoing discussion suggests that a feasible allocation 
( )( )Iqq ,, 21  must satisfy 
                                                 
13 Actually, the contingency capacity limits of lines 1 and 3 will also be enhanced by the capacitor. But we do not need to 
consider these enhancements, because these two lines already have enough capacities, both in normal conditions and in the 
contingency. 
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Dqq =+ 21  
121 6
1
3
1 kqq ≤+  
Ikqq +≤+ 121 2.14
1
2
1  
Among the feasible allocations, those that minimize the social cost are efficient 
allocations. Formally, an efficient allocation ( )( )**2*1 ,, Iqq  solves the following problem: 
( ) ( ) ( )ICqCqC
Iqq
++≥ 22110,, 21min                                            (34) 
s.t. Dqq =+ 21     
121 6
1
3
1 kqq ≤+                                                               (35) 
Ikqq +≤+ 121 2.14
1
2
1                                                     (36) 
Since the cost functions are assumed to be strictly convex and the constraints are linear, this 
problem has a unique solution.  
Before solving this problem, note that for every dispatch ( )21 , qq , the associated flow 
through line 22 in normal conditions is lower than the flow in the contingency: 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +=+ 2121 4
1
2
1
3
2
6
1
3
1 qqqq . As a result, in the absence of a capacitor ( 0=I ) constraint (35) 
will not bind, or else constraint (36) would be violated. In other words, the contingency 
capacity limit of line 22 causes the capacities of lines 21 and 22 to be underutilized in normal 
circumstances. Hence, the benefit of adding a capacitor consists of allowing a more efficient 
use of a the line capacities under normal conditions and enhancing contingency capacities. 
Obviously, this benefit should be compared to the cost of the capacitor and the incremental 
cost of the new dispatch induced. 
Now solve problem (34) for the efficient allocation ( )( )**2*1 ,, Iqq . Let λ , μ , and η  be 
the Lagrangian multipliers of the constraints in the problem, respectively. Then the FOCs are: 
( ) ημλ
2
1
3
1
1
*
11 −−≥∂
∂
q
qC  with equality if 0*1 >q                             (37) 
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( ) ημλ
4
1
6
1
2
*
22 −−≥∂
∂
q
qC  with equality if 0*2 >q                            (38) 
( ) η≥∂∂ IIC
*
 with equality if 0* >I                                                 (39) 
Dqq =+ *2*1                                                                                    (40) 
1
*
2
*
1 6
1
3
1 kqq ≤+  with equality if 0>μ                                          (41) 
*
1
*
2
*
1 2.14
1
2
1 Ikqq +≤+  with equality if 0>η                              (42) 
To understand the above conditions, consider an interior efficient allocation 
( )( ) 0,, **2*1 >>Iqq . Since the generation at both nodes is positive, constraints (37) and (38) are 
satisfied with equality. By inspection, this implies that the marginal cost of a MW at node 1 
is lower than the marginal cost of a MW at node 2. Hence, if we could generate  qΔ  
additional units at the cheaper node 1 and qΔ  less units at the costly node 2, we would save 
the amount 
( ) ( ) q
q
qCq
q
qC Δ∂
∂−Δ∂
∂
1
*
11
2
*
22 and still satisfies the load. The problem is that we 
cannot transfer qΔ  units of generation from 2G  to 1G  without violating the contingency 
constraint (42). Therefore, if we want to enjoy the above savings we have to relax the 
contingency constraint by means of an increase in the operational capacity of line 22 under 
the contingency. We should increase this operational capacity by a small unit as long as its 
cost is no bigger than the savings induced by the redispatch that this investment allows. At 
the optimum, the marginal cost of the capacity should be equal to or higher than its marginal 
benefit: 
( ) ( ) ( ) q
q
qCq
q
qC
I
IC Δ∂
∂−Δ∂
∂≥∂
∂
1
*
11
2
*
22
*
 
And this is precisely one of the implications of the FOCs (37)-(42). To see this, note that 
since 0* >I , condition (39) holds with equality, ( ) η=∂∂ IIC
*
. By assumption, the marginal 
cost of capacitor-induced capacity is positive, so 0>η  and consequently constraint (42) is 
binding. Let us consider two cases, one with constraint (41) being unbinding and the other 
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that constraint being binding. If constraint (41) does not bind at the optimal allocation, 0=μ . 
A unit of additional capacity in case of a contingency allows us to change the injections in 
nodes 1 and 2, by 1qΔ  and 2qΔ , respectively, where 1qΔ  and 2qΔ  satisfy 
1
4
1
2
1
21 =Δ+Δ qq  
021 =Δ+Δ qq  
This means that the unit of additional capacity allows us to redispatch in a way that 41 =Δq  
and 42 −=Δq . That is, 1G  produces 4 more units and 2G  produces 4 less units. The saving 
in the generation cost induced by this new dispatch is 
( ) ( )
ηημ
ημλημλ
=+=
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−−=Δ∂
∂−Δ∂
∂−
3
2                                                
4
1
6
1
2
1
3
141
1
*
11
2
2
*
22 q
q
qCq
q
qC
 
Now consider the second case in which constraint (41) is binding. Although it saves 
and the demand is still satisfied if we could have 1G  produce qΔ  ( 0>Δq ) more and 2G  
produce qΔ  less, this transfer would not be feasible even with the additional unit of 
contingency capacity, because at the new dispatch constraint (41) would be violated: 
0 ,0
6
1
3
1 >Δ∀>Δ−Δ qqq  
In other words, we can only have 0=Δq  and no cost would be saved. Hence, the marginal 
benefit of one more unit enhancement in the contingency capacity is zero, which is less than 
the marginal cost of the capacity ( )
I
IC
∂
∂ * . In all, the marginal benefit of the investment is no 
greater than its marginal cost at the optimal allocation.  
Knowing the efficient dispatch and investment level, we wonder if they can be 
decentralized by means of a price system and competitive markets. In the following 
definition of economic equilibrium, there will be nodal prices and two different transmission 
changes. Both transmission charges are related to congestion on the 1-3 corridor. One charge 
is associated to the transmission on the corridor under normal conditions and the other, to the 
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transmission under the contingency. The generators and investment firm will take these 
prices as given and make their generation and investment decision optimally. 
An allocation ( )( )**2*1 ,, Iqq  and a price vector ( )π,,,, 321 tppp  constitute a competitive 
equilibrium of this economy if the following conditions are satisfied: 
1. Each generator nG , for 2,1=n , chooses its generation level *nq  so as to maximize its 
profit given its own nodal price np : 
( ) ( ) 2,1 ,0 ,** =≥∀−≥− nqqCqpqCqp nnnnnnnnn                        (43) 
2. The investment firm chooses the investment level *I  so as to maximize its profit given 
the contingency transmission charge π :  
( ) ( ) 0 ,** ≥∀−≥− IICIICI ππ                                            (44) 
3. Power market clears: 
Dqq =+ *2*1                                                            (45) 
4. Transmission market clears: 
1
*
2
*
1 6
1
3
1 kqq ≤+  with equality if 0>μ                                      (46) 
      *1
*
2
*
1 2.14
1
2
1 Ikqq +≤+  with equality if 0>η                          (47) 
5. No arbitrage opportunity exists: 
π
2
12
3
1
13 ++= tpp                                                    (48) 
π
4
12
6
1
23 ++= tpp                                                    (49) 
Note that the capacitor only enhances the contingency capacity. Accordingly, the 
investment firm will collect the congestion charge in the contingency. Conditions (46) and 
(47) require that the demand for transmission should not exceed the capacity both under 
normal conditions and under the contingency. Besides, the associated transmission charge is 
positive only if the demand for transmission equals the capacity. To understand conditions 
(48) and (49), note that if we inject one MW at node 1 and eject it at node 3, in normal 
circumstances 
3
1  of the MW will transit through each of lines 21 and 22. In a contingency, 
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2
1  of the MW will move along the remaining line 22. Therefore, each MW injected at node 1 
and withdrawn at node 3 must pay 
3
1  of the price of transmission on line 21 and line 22 
together under normal conditions and 
2
1  of the price of transmission on line 22 under the 
contingency. If we add the power price at node 1, the cost of buying one MW at that node 
and transmitting it to node 3 is π
2
12
3
1
1 ++ tp . Condition (48) states that this cost should 
equal the price that one would obtain by selling this MW at the destination node 3. A similar 
interpretation applies to condition (49). The contingency congestion charge is paid not only 
when a contingency occurs, but also when it does not. 
The necessary and sufficient conditions for problems (43) and (44) are: 
( )
n
n
nn p
q
qC ≥∂
∂ *
 with equality if 0*1 >q                                       (50) 
      ( ) π≥∂∂ IIC
*
 with equality if 0* >I                                          (51) 
In all, a competitive equilibrium is characterized by conditions (50) and (51) and conditions 
(45) through (49). 
By comparison, we see that if an allocation ( )( )**2*1 ,, Iqq  solves the social optimum 
problem (34) with associated Lagrangian multipliers ( )ημλ ,, , then the same allocation 
together with the price vector ( )π,,,, 321 tppp  defined by 
ημλ
2
1
3
1
1 −−=p  
ημλ
4
1
6
1
2 −−=p  
λ=3p  
2
μ=t  
ηπ =  
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is a competitive equilibrium. Conversely, if an allocation ( )( )**2*1 ,, Iqq  and a price vector 
( )π,,,, 321 tppp  constitute a competitive equilibrium, then the same allocation together with 
the Lagrangian multipliers ( )ημλ ,,  defined by 
3p=λ  
t2=μ  
πη =  
solves the social optimum problem (34). 
The above analysis shows that the competitive equilibrium is efficient. In particular, 
the competitive equilibrium induces the optimal amount of capacitor-induced capacity 
enhancement. The reason is that adding capacitors has no effect on the distribution factors 
under normal conditions or under a contingency. Hence, the flows of power along the lines 
for any given set of injections is unchanged by the investment. Therefore, as long as it leaves 
the flows of power for any given set of net injections unaffected, transmission investment 
will not induce externalities that cause the market to fail even in the presence of loop flows. 
The three-node network is miniature of more complicated, meshed networks and the 
result from this simple example is valid for a network with more nodes. In addition, the 
model here applies to other control methods such as adding SVC (Static Var Compensator) 
and STATCOM (Static Synchronous Compensator), because adding those controllers does 
not change the distribution factors, either. Therefore, the result from this example can be 
extended to the general control approach. 
2.6 Grid Expansion 
So far, we have focused on transmission investment within a fixed grid topology. 
That is, no line is built between a pair of nodes that, originally, are not directly connected by 
a line before the investment. The main result from the preceding section is that given a grid 
topology, capacity enhancement that changes the distribution factors introduces an 
externality that may cause the investment in equilibrium to be inefficient. For referral 
convenience, let us call this type I transmission investment. There is no market failure with 
capacity enhancement that does not affect the distribution factors and the investment in 
equilibrium is efficient or optimal. Let us call this type II transmission investment. We can 
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say that type II transmission investment is constrained optimal, in the sense that it is optimal 
given the grid topology. In this section, we will consider the case of grid expansion, in which 
the grid topology itself it also to be determined. And the efficient or optimal allocation in this 
case is, in comparison, fully optimal or socially optimal. Apparently, type I transmission 
investment is usually not fully optimal, since it is not even constrained optimal. So the issue 
of full optimality versus constrained optimality is only relevant to type II transmission 
investment. Then is type II transmission investment optimal when the grid topology is 
endogenous? The answer is no. 
Consider a fixed set of N  nodes. Given a grid topology with the set of existing 
corridors denoted by 1L , the equilibrium allocation 1CE  in the case of type II transmission 
investment is efficient and yields the highest social surplus *1SS  that can be achieved under 
this very topology. Given a different grid topology with the set of existing corridors denoted 
by 2L , the corresponding equilibrium allocation 2CE  yields the highest social surplus 
*
2SS  
under this different topology. Generally, *2
*
1 SSSS ≠ . If *2*1 SSSS > , then 2CE  is not socially 
optimal (although constrained optimal), since there exists at least one other allocation 1CE  
that results in a higher social surplus than does 2CE . Whether 1CE  is socially optimal 
depends on whether the social surplus resulting from it is the highest among all the 
constrained optimal allocations associated with all the possible topologies. If it is, 1CE  will 
be socially optimal. In general, there can be many different grid topologies for a fixed set of 
nodes and each of them has an equilibrium which is optimal under that specific topology. 
Among them, some grid topology and the corresponding competitive equilibrium with type II 
transmission investment amounts to the highest social surplus. That very grid topology and 
the transmission investment in the corresponding equilibrium are fully optimal, while the 
others are only constrained optimal, and not fully optimal. What follows is a numerical 
example, illustrating the difference between constrained and full optimality as well as our 
reasoning above. 
Figure 6 gives three nodes, 1, 2, and 3 and originally there is no transmission line 
between any two of them. Generators 1G  and 2G  are located at node 1 and node 2 and have 
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the cost function ( ) 21 20 qqqC +=  and ( ) 22 2
110 qqqC += , respectively. The only load of 
1000MW is located at node 3 and there is no generator at that node. Given the three nodes, 
there can be at most three corridors, one between each pair of nodes (denoted in dashed lines). 
There is an investment firm that makes type II transmission investment according to the cost 
function ( ) ( ) 000,000,1
3
1,, 321
2
3
2
2
2
1321 −+++++= IIIIIIIIIC , where nI , for 3,2,1=n  is 
the new capacity built on corridor n. We will ignore contingency constraints in this example. 
Including them can only affect the numerical results and complicate the calculation, but will 
not change anything essential.  
 
Figure 6: Three nodes 
Let us first consider the case when there are two lines, 1 and 2 in the beginning, with 
one between nodes 1 and 3 and the other between nodes 2 and 3. For calculation simplicity, 
assume that the impedance is the same for the two lines and their original capacities are both 
normalized to zero. The investment firm makes investment within this grid topology. A 
competitive equilibrium of this economy consists of a price vector ( )21321 ,,,, ttppp , 
production plans of the generators ( )*2*1 , qq , and an investment plan of the investment firm 
( )*2*1 , II 14. The concrete numbers are shown in Figure 7. As shown earlier, the equilibrium 
allocation is the same as the allocation derived from solving the optimality problem. That is, 
this competitive equilibrium is optimal given the two-line topology. 
                                                 
14 Here we have 0*3 =I , since there is no investment between node 1 and node 2.  
  
43
 
Figure 7: Two-line equilibrium 
There is another equilibrium in which three lines are built. Figure 8 illustrates this 
equilibrium: a price vector ( )321321 ,,,,, tttppp , production plans ( )*2*1 , qq  and an investment 
plan ( )*3*2*1 ,, III . Similarly, we can show that this equilibrium is optimal given the three-line 
topology. 
 
Figure 8: Three-line equilibrium 
So the type II transmission investment in both the two-line and three-line equilibria 
above is constrained optimal. The social cost in the equilibrium with two lines is $204,755, 
which is lower than $222,869, the cost in the equilibrium with three lines. This is reasonable, 
since in the two-line equilibrium more electricity is produced by the cheaper generator, 2G . 
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Hence, the three-line equilibrium is not socially optimal. To see if the two-line equilibrium is 
socially optimal, we need to compare it with all the other equilibria. As we can not tell which 
equilibrium the economy will end up with, it is guaranteed that the equilibrium will be 
socially optimal, although it must be constrained optimal. 
From this section and the preceding one, we find that transmission investment that 
does not change the flow structure of the network may not be socially optimal, but is always 
constrained optimal given the grid topology. This result is consistent with our earlier finding 
that transmission investment introduces an externality if its affects the flow of power along 
the lines for any given set of injections. In the case of grid expansion, both type I and type II 
investments change the distribution factors, since the line topology is affected. Therefore, 
there is a market failure whether type I or type II investment is made. Here we do not use the 
derivatives as we do in section 5, because building a line between two nodes that are not 
originally connected causes a jump in the capacity of that line, so differentiation no longer 
applies. However, the cause for the market failure in grid expansion is still the externality 
created by loop flows.  
So far, we have been playing with the model of certainty. In reality, however, there 
can be many uncertain aspects in power and transmission markets. For example, instead of 
being deterministic, the loads or generation technology may vary across different states. To 
consider these facts, we introduce uncertainty to the previous model by allowing for state-
dependent preferences and technology. See Appendix 3. 
2.7 Concluding Remarks 
Market-based transmission investment under perfect competition is not efficient, due 
to the externalities caused by loop flows. However, why and how loop flows create 
externalities is a question that has never been answered. The externalities are associated with 
loop flows, but it is not that externalities are introduced whenever there are loop flows. This 
paper clarifies the nature of loop externalities and points out when loop flows are a problem 
and when they are not. In doing so, we develop a model with endogenized transmission 
investment. From the model, we conclude that transmission investment introduces an 
externality if and only if it affects the flow of power along the lines for a given set of 
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injections. Interestingly these externalities are not like those in the usual sense, in that neither 
the consumers' preferences nor the generators' technologies are directly affected by the 
transmission investment actions. Instead, the externalities come in because transmission 
investment changes the physical aspects of the network, i.e. the way in which electricity is 
transmitted. To illustrate the general model, we analyze two different types of transmission 
investment in two three-node examples, respectively. The first type of investment is building 
new transmission links and the second is introducing additional control capability. We find 
that in a meshed network, transmission investment in lines at a competitive equilibrium is not 
guaranteed to be optimal, while investment in control is. This result is consistent with our 
earlier conclusion. Building new lines results in externalities, because it affects the flow of 
power along the lines for a given set of injections. In contrast, placing control leaves the flow 
structure unchanged, so there is no externality even in the presence of loop flows.  These 
results apply to the case of grid expansion and also hold in an economy with uncertainty. 
Now we can answer the questions raised in the beginning of the paper. The addition 
or removal of lines are not necessary for markets to fail: the competitive equilibrium will not 
be efficient even if the grid topology is restricted to remain the same but upgrades of line 
capacities that change the power flow are allowed. The change in the set of feasible 
injections itself is not responsible for the market failure: as long as the line capacities are 
changed in a flow-preserving way, there will be no externalities associated with the 
investment. Finally, the fact that injections in one bus affect the set of allowable injections in 
other buses is not the source of externalities, either. The truth of the last two statements can 
be seen by observing a two-bus network: in such a network, the flow structure is always the 
same; namely, each MW injected in one bus transits the only line, independently of its 
capacity. In conclusion, the externalities leading to inefficient transmission investment are 
caused by loop flows, but the existence of loop flows does not necessarily result in such 
externalities. It does, only when the transmission investment changes the flows of power 
along the lines for any given of injections. 
Our paper points out an externality that is only found in the power market. There is 
no objection that regulation is needed in transmission expansion planning. However, so far, 
most emphasis has been focused on the regulation necessary to control market power or 
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natural monopoly. Admittedly, these attributes can lead to inefficient transmission 
investment, but this is not a result specific to the power industry. Loop externalities, instead 
are something that is not available in other industries. They are inherent in power markets 
regardless of the market structure, but have never been given attention. Our paper warns that 
even if the power and transmission investment markets were competitive and each market 
participant were forced to price as if it were a price taker, market failure could still occur due 
to the loop externalities we identify. Admittedly, things may be more complicated in 
investment markets with market power, because in that case not only the loop externalities 
but also market power will contribute to inefficient transmission investment. But regulation 
that only mitigates market power is not enough to achieve efficient transmission investment. 
Clearly the loop flow externalities must also be taken into account in defining property rights 
and creating incentives for efficient transmission investment and in devising regulation 
schemes to achieve second-best results. 
The model in this paper is static and everything takes place one-shot. The investment 
firms make transmission investment and have the costs recovered immediately and once. In 
reality, a transmission investment project usually takes a relatively long time to be completed; 
the built facilities are used for many periods afterwards and the investment cost is recovered 
period by period, instead of all at once; there may be entry or exit of market participants in 
the long run; and the grid may evolve gradually with transmission investment. Although 
these attributes are not reflected in our model here, it does address the externalities created by 
loop flows that also exist in a dynamic scenario. In future we can develop a dynamic model, 
but the inclusion of the dynamic attributes should not change the result that transmission 
investment introduces an externality if it affects the flow structure of the network. The 
externalities associated with loop flows will always be there, whether we do static or 
dynamic modeling. A meaningful and important extension of our current work will be to see 
how efficient transmission investment can be achieved through proper market design that 
addresses those externalities.  
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2.9 Appendices 
Appendix 1: Derivation of equation (1) 
The voltage at bus i is a sinusoid waveform whose instantaneous value at time t is 
( ) ( )iii tVtv θω += sin  
where iV  is the magnitude (amplitude) of the sinusoid waveform, 602 ×= πω  is the 
frequency of the waveform in radians per second and iθ  is its phase angle. Given the 
impedances ijZ , the real power flow over the line from i to j is given by 
( )
ij
jiji
ji Z
VV
f
θθ −=→ sin                                                (72) 
measured in MW. ix , the net power injection at bus i is the sum of the flows jif →  over all 
Nj ,...,1= : 
( )∑∑
==
→ =∀
−==
N
j ij
jiji
N
j
jii NiZ
VV
fx
11
,...,1 ,
sin θθ
                         (73) 
Assume that the voltage magnitude iV  at bus i is constant. Without loss of generality, we can 
set 1≡iV  for all Ni ,...,1= . Then (72) and (73) become: 
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( )
Nji
Z
f
ij
ji
ji ,...,1, ,
sin =∀−=→
θθ
                                         (74) 
( )∑
=
=∀−=
N
j ij
ji
i NiZ
x
1
,...,1 ,
sin θθ
                                            (75) 
Equations in (75) are the “real power flow equations”. Only N-1 of these equations are 
independent, since 0
1
≡∑
=
N
i
ix  in a lossless system. Besides, what matters are the phase angle 
difference, rather than the angles themselves. Thus, we can set 0≡Nθ  and eliminate the Nth 
equation in (75). Node N can then be regarded as the reference node in the network15. Now 
we have N-1 equations with N-1 unknowns, 11 ,..., −Nθθ . Given the net power injections 
11 ,..., −Nxx , we can solve for the phase angles ( )11* ,..., −= Nii xxθθ , 1,...,1 −= Ni  and obtain 
the flow on each line by (74).  
Now we make one more simplifying assumption: the phase angle differences, 
|| ji θθ − , are very small. Then the following approximation holds: jiji θθθθ −≈− )sin( . As 
a result, equations (74) and (75) all become linear, and the solutions * 1
*
1 ,..., −Nθθ  are linear in 
the net injections. That is, 
( ) ( )
∑−
=
−−
→
=∀=
−=
−=
1
1
1111
**
,...,1, ,        
,...,,...,
        
N
n
n
ij
n
ij
NjNi
ij
ji
ji
Njix
Z
xxxx
Z
f
α
θθ
θθ
 
where ijnα  are functions of ijZ . Since ijZ  are constant for a fixed grid, so are ijnα . 
 
                                                 
15 The reference node refers to the node with the phase angle 0. In determining the distribution factors or calculating flows, 
the reference node can be treated as if it were the only withdrawal node and all the others were injection nodes in the 
network. 
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Appendix 2: Proof of the ad valorem tax rate of ( ) ( )*2*1* qqI
I −∂
∂α  being the 
second best 
Suppose that the government imposes an ad valorem tax τ  on the capacity 
enhancement of corridor 3. Then the investment firm’s profit maximization problem becomes 
( ) ( )ICIt
I
−−
≥
τ1max
0
 
which has the FOC 
( ) ( )t
I
IC −=∂
∂ 1
*
τ  
And the other conditions that a competitive equilibrium should satisfy are 
( )
2,1  ,
*
==∂
∂ np
q
qC
n
n
nn  
Dqq =+ *2*1  
( )( ) *0*2*1* IkqqI +=−α  
( )tIpp *13 α+=  
( )tIpp *23 α−=                                
By comparison, we can see that if an allocation ( )( )**2*1 ,, Iqq  solves the social optimum 
problem (24) with associated Lagrangian multipliers ( )μλ, , then the same allocation 
( )( )**2*1 ,, Iqq  together with a price vector ( )tppp ,,, 321  and an ad valorem tax rate τ  
defined by 
( )μαλ *1 kp −=  
( )μαλ *2 kp +=  
λ=3p  
μ=t  
( )( )*2*1* qqII −∂∂= ατ  
  
52
is a competitive equilibrium. Conversely, if an allocation ( )( )**2*1 ,, Iqq  together with a 
price vector ( )tppp ,,, 321  and an ad valorem tax rate ( )( )*2*1* qqII −∂∂= ατ  constitute a 
competitive equilibrium, then the same allocation ( )( )**2*1 ,, Iqq  together with the 
Lagrangian multipliers ( )μλ,  defined by 
t
p
=
=
μ
λ 3  
solve the social optimum problem (24). So, we can achieve efficiency by imposing the 
ad valorem tax ( )( )*2*1* qqII −∂∂= ατ  on the transmission investment. 
 
Appendix 3: Transmission investment under uncertainty 
(1) Model specification and assumptions 
There are two commodities in the economy, namely power and the numeraire. The 
settings and nomenclature about the grid are the same as before. Still assume that only one 
consumer and one generator are attached to each node. All the existing lines of the network 
are owned by a single TO. Different from before, there are two periods, 1,0=t and two states 
of the world, OHPHs ,= . We may think of states PH and OH as the peak hour and off-peak 
hour, respectively. Let PHπ  and OHπ  be the probability that state PH and state OH occurs, 
respectively, such that 1=+ OHPH ππ . The true state is revealed in period 1. 
Consumers have different endowments and utility functions in different states. 
Specifically, in state s, consumer n is endowed with a fixed amount of the numeraire snω  and 
a quasi-linear utility function RRRu sn →× +:  such that 
( ) ( ) OHPHsNncmcmu snsnsnsnsnsn ,,,...,1 , ==∀+=+ φ  
where 0≥snc , and Rmsn ∈  denote the consumer’s consumption of power and the numeraire, 
respectively in state s. ( )snsn cφ  is assumed to be bounded above with ( ) 0>∂∂ sn
s
n
s
n
c
cφ
, 
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( )
( ) 02
2
<∂
∂
s
n
s
n
s
n
c
cφ
, and ( ) 00 =snφ . So the total amount of the numeraire available in the economy 
in state s is 
OHPHs
N
n
s
ns , ,
1
== ∑
=
ωϖ  
Generators’ technologies also depend on the state. In state s, generator n has a 
production set given by 
( ) ( ){ } OHPHsNnqCzqqzY snsnsnsnsnsnsn ,,,...,1 , and 0:, ==≥≥−=  
where ( )snsn qC  is the generator’s cost function in state s, measured in the numeraire in the 
same state. Assume that ( )snsn qC  is twice differentiable with ( ) 0>∂∂ sn
s
n
s
n
q
qC
, 
( )
( ) 02
2
>∂
∂
s
n
s
n
s
n
q
qC
, and 
( ) 00 =snC . 
There is a set E of investment firms indexed by Er ∈ . They make investment 
decisions in period 0, before the true state is revealed. Therefore, no matter which state 
occurs in period 1, investment firms have to produce with the same technology given in (3) 
in section 3 and the investment levels are independent of the state. Still let rI l  be the new 
transmission capacity on corridor ℓ built by investment firm r, then the total investment on 
that corridor is ∑
∈
=
Er
rII ll . As the investment affects the distribution factors, they can be 
expressed as ( )( )Lvvn I ∈lα .  
(2) Efficient allocation 
Like before, an allocation consists of each consumer's consumption plan, each 
generator's production plan and each investment firm's investment plan. The difference is that 
under uncertainty, the consumption and production plans depend on the true state of world. 
The investment plan, which is carried out before the true state is revealed, is state 
independent. Now an efficient allocation in this economy with uncertainty can defined as 
follows: 
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Definition 4: A feasible allocation ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )ErLrrOHPHsNnsnsnNnsnsn Izqzcm ∈∈=== −− ll,,,,, ,11  in this 
economy is a specification of a consumption bundle ( ) +×∈ RRcm snsn ,  for each consumer 
Nn ,...,1=  in each state OHPHs ,= , a production plan ( ) snsnsn Yqz ∈− ,  for each generator 
Nn ,...,1=  in each state OHPHs ,= , and an investment plan ( )( ) rrr YIz ∈− l,  for each 
investment firm Er ∈ , such that 
∑ ∑∑
= ∈=
=++
N
n Er
s
rs
n
N
n
s
n zzm
11
ϖ                                                            (52) 
∑∑
==
=
N
n
s
n
N
n
s
n qc
11
                                                                                (53) 
( )( )( )∑−
=
∈ ∈∀+≤−
1
1
0   ,
N
n
s
n
s
nLvvn LIkcqI llllα                                     (54) 
for OHPHs ,= .  
Condition (52) requires the equality between the total amount of the numeraire for 
consumption, production and investment and the amount of the numeraire available in the 
economy in each state. Condition (53) dictates that the total electricity generation should 
satisfy the total demand in each state. Condition (54) requires that in each state the flow 
along every line must not exceed its capacity limit. Comparing these conditions with 
conditions (5)-(7), we can see that the conditions under uncertainty are nothing more than the 
conditions under certainty applied to different states, since now everything except the 
transmission investment is state-contingent. 
Among the feasible allocations, those that cannot be improved upon are efficient 
allocations, defined in the following: 
Definition 5: A feasible allocation ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )ErLrrOHPHsNnsnsnNnsnsn Izqzcm ∈∈=== −− ll **,1**1** ,,,,,  is 
efficient (or optimal) if there is no alternative feasible allocation 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )ErLrrOHPHsNnsnsnNnsnsn Izqzcm ∈∈=== −− ll,,,,, ,11  such that 
( ) ( ) Nncmucmu
OHPHs
s
n
s
n
s
ns
OHPHs
s
n
s
n
s
ns ,...,1 ,,,
,
**
,
=∀≥ ∑∑
==
ππ  with strict inequality for at least one 
agent n. 
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According to the definition, no other feasible allocation can make an agent better-off 
than the efficient allocation without hurting the other agents. Under uncertainty, the agent's 
welfare is measured by the expected utility. Formally, an efficient allocation 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )ErLrrOHPHsNnsnsnNnsnsn Izqzcm ∈∈=== −− ll **,1**1** ,,,,,  solves the following problem: 
( ) ( ) ( )∑ ∑∑∑
= ∈==
= ∈∈
=∀
≥
−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −
OHPHs Er
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L
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N
n
s
n
s
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OHPHs
ErL
Nn
cqc
IICqCc
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n
s
n ,
1
11
,
,
,,...,1
0,,
,...,max φπ
l
l
        (55) 
s.t. ∑∑
==
=
N
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n
N
n
s
n qc
11
, OHPHs ,=  
( )( )( )∑−
=
∈ ∈∀+≤−
1
1
0   ,
N
n
s
n
s
nLvvn LIkcqI llllα , OHPHs ,=  
Assume that ( )⋅lnα  are convex to guarantee convexity of the set of feasible allocations. Let 
( )( ) OHPHsLss ,, =∈llμλ  be the Lagragian multipliers of the constraints above, respectively. Then 
the FOCs for an efficient allocation are 
( ) ( )( ) 1,...,1 ,0 ifequality  with , *** −=∀>−≤∂∂ ∑∈ ∈ NncIcc snL Lvvnsssnsn
s
n
s
l
l
l μμλφπ  
( ) 0 ifequality  with , ** >≤∂∂ sNssNsN
s
N
s ccc
λφπ  
( ) ( )( ) 1,...,1 ,0 ifequality  with , *** −=∀>−≤∂∂ ∑∈ ∈ NnqIqq
C s
n
L
Lvvn
s
s
s
ns
n
s
n
s
l
l
l μμλπ           (56) 
( ) 0 ifequality  with , ** >≤∂∂ sNssNsN
s
N
s qqq
C λπ  
( ) ErLIII
I
CB r
OHPHs
r
L
r
r
r
s ∈∈∀>∂
∂≤−∑
=
, ,0 ifequality  with ,,..., *
,
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for OHPHs ,= , and where ( )( )( )∑ ∑ ∑
= =
−
=
∈ −∂
∂=
OHPHs
L
z
N
n
s
n
s
n
Lvv
z
ns
z cqI
I
B
, 1
1
1
**
*
l
αμ . Essentially, the 
FOCs here are analogous to the FOCs for the social optimum problem under certainty (8), 
applied to each of the two states.  
The last two equations above are the feasibility conditions: aggregate power 
generation should be equal to the aggregate power consumption, and the line flows induced 
by the dispatch should satisfy the corresponding capacity constraints. The multipliers slμ , for 
L∈l  and OHPHs ,=  are the marginal social benefit in state s from one more MW increase 
in the capacity of line l , or alternatively, the marginal social cost in state s of reducing the 
capacity on line l  by one MW. This social benefit can be positive only when the flow 
constraint is binding in that state at the efficient allocation. The multiplier sλ  is the marginal 
social benefit in state s of one more MW consumed at the reference node N, or equivalently 
the marginal social cost in state s of one more MW produced at node N. 
The first two sets of conditions necessitate that in each state, for 0* >snc , the private 
benefit from one more unit of power supplied at node n be equal to the social cost of 
supplying it at that node. This social cost, ( )( )∑
∈
∈−
L
Lvvn
s
s I
l
l
l
*μμλ  is equal to the social cost of 
supplying an additional MW at the residual node, sλ  plus the social cost of transmitting the 
one MW to node n, ( )( )∑
∈
∈−
L
Lvvn
s I
l
l
l
*μμ .  
The second two sets of equations state that the private cost of generation of one MW 
at each node n in state s should equal the social cost of generating an additional MW at that 
node in that state, unless 0* =snq , in which case the private cost can be greater than the social 
cost, which is ( )( )∑
∈
∈−
L
Lvvn
s
s I
l
l
l
*μμλ .  
Lastly, equations in (57) require that the marginal private cost of the investment on 
the capacity of line l  be equal to the social benefit of that investment. The social benefit 
consists of two parts. One is the social benefit of the increased capacity of the line, ∑
= OHPHs
s
,
lμ , 
which is equal to the sum of the social benefit in each state. The second part B is the social 
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cost for both states incurred by the change in the distribution factors due to the investment on 
line l .  
(3) Arrow-Debreu equilibrium 
In this part, we will see what the decentralized outcome of this economy will be. 
Before defining the market equilibrium, let us introduce the concept of (state) contingent 
commodities. For every physical commodity Gg ,...,1=  and state Ss ,...,1= , a unit of (state) 
contingency commodity sg  is a title to receive a unit of the good g iff state s occurs. So the 
number of contingent commodities is G×S, the number of physical commodities times the 
number of states. In our model, we postulate the existence of a competitive market for each 
contingent commodity, namely power at each node, transmission on each line and the 
numeraire, in each state. These markets open before the resolution of uncertainty, that is, at 
t=0 and are for delivery of goods at t=1 (they are commonly called forward markets). For 
each state OHPHs ,= , there will be electricity prices snp  associated with each node, 
transmission price stl  on each corridor and the numeraire price sw . In the model without 
uncertainty, the price of the numeraire is normalized to unity. Here, with uncertainty, the 
price of the numeraire is contingent on the state and not necessarily the same in both states. 
So, we can not simply normalize the numeraire price in each state to unity. In this economy, 
there is ex ante trade only, and no ex post trade. What is being purchased (or sold) in the 
market for a contingent commodity is commitments to receive (or to deliver) amounts of that 
physical good, if, and when, state s occurs. In period t = 1, a state s is revealed, contracts are 
executed, and every consumer receives a consumption bundle. Observe that although 
deliveries are contingent, the payments are not. Notice also that for the markets to be well 
defined it is indispensable that all economic agents be able to recognize the occurrence of 
state s. That is, information should be symmetric across economic agents. So we assume that 
the probability sπ is common knowledge. 
In each state, each generator decides how much electricity to produce in response to 
its own nodal price and each consumer decides how much electricity to consume in response 
to her own nodal price. Given all the nodal prices and transmission prices in both states, the 
investment firms, before knowing the true state, choose how much extra capacity to build 
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through transmission investment. Like before, the generators, investment firms and TO are 
owned by the consumers. Then the market equilibrium of this economy with uncertainty can 
be defined as follows. 
Definition 6: An allocation ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )ErLrrOHPHsNnsnsnNnsnsn Izqzcm ∈∈=== −− ll **,1**1** ,,,,,  and a 
system of prices for the contingent commodities ( ) ( ) ( )( ) OHPHsLsNnsns tpwtpw ,1 ,,,, =∈== ll  
constitute an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium if: 
1. Generators’ profit maximization: For each generator Nn ,...,1= , ( ) snsnsn Yqz ∈− ** ,  for 
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5. Market clearing: For each state OHPHs ,=  
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Note that at any production or investment plan, the profit of a generator or of an 
investment firm is a nonrandom amount of dollars, as in conditions 1 and 2 above. This is 
because in the Arrow-Debreu framework, although productions and deliveries of goods 
depend on the state of the world, the firm is active in all the contingent markets and manages 
to insure completely. 
Now let us characterize the five conditions in the definition above. Condition 1 says 
that each generator maximizes its total profit across the two states, given its own technology 
and nodal price: formally, it chooses *snq , for OHPHs ,=  to solve 
( )( )∑
==∀
≥
−
OHPHs
s
n
s
n
s
n
s
n
OHPHs
q
qCqp
s
n ,,
0
max  
The necessary and sufficient conditions for *snq  to solve the problem are 
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According to condition 2, each investment firm maximizes its profit, taking its own 
technology and the transmission price on each line as given: it chooses ( )**1 ,..., rLr II  so as to 
solve 
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The corresponding necessary and sufficient conditions are: 
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In condition 3, each consumer maximizes her expected utility within the budget 
constraint, given the nodal price of her own node: she solves the following problem 
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where the right-hand side of the constraint is consumer n’s total wealth across the two states. 
The necessary and sufficient conditions for a utility maximizing consumption bundle are 
OHPHswsns , ,0 ==−ηπ                                                                         (62) 
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where nη  is the Lagrangian multiplier of the consumer’s budget constraint. From equations 
(62) we have 
OH
PH
OH
PH
w
w=π
π . Since only the relative prices matter in deriving the equilibrium, 
we can let PHPHw π=  and OHOHw π= . Then 1=nη  and (63) become 
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Besides, (60) and (61) can be rewritten as follows, respectively 
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We can infer from Section 3 that a necessary and sufficient condition for the no-
arbitrage condition to hold is that in each state the price at the residual node N must be equal 
to the nodal price at each node n=1,...,N plus the transmission charge for transmitting one 
unit of power from node n to node N. Formally, conditions (58) are equivalent to  
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The proof of necessity and sufficiency is similar to that in Subsection 3.5 and will not be 
repeated here.  
The last condition in the definition states that at the equilibrium prices, supply equals 
demand for the numeraire, power and transmission, respectively. 
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In summary, the necessary and sufficient conditions for allocation 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )ErLrrOHPHsNnsnsnNnsnsn Izqzcm ∈∈=== −− ll **,1**1** ,,,,,  and price vector 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) OHPHsLsNnsns tpwtpw ,1 ,,,, =∈== ll  to constitute a competitive equilibrium are:  
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At an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium all trade takes place simultaneously and before the 
uncertainty is resolved. In reality, trade takes place to a large extent sequentially over time, 
and frequently as a consequence of information disclosures. Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green 
(1995) have shown that Arrow-Debreu equilibria can be reinterpreted by means of trading 
processes that actually unfold through time. In this paper, we only adopt the Arrow-Debreu 
framework and do not consider sequential trading, but the result should be the same. 
(4) Comparison between Arrow-Debreu equilibrium and efficient allocation 
Now we want to answer these questions for the scenario with uncertainty: is the 
Arrow-Debreu equilibrium efficient or can the efficient allocation be decentralized? To be 
more specific, is the transmission investment level in equilibrium socially optimal? If not, 
what causes the problem? Recall that for the economy without uncertainty, the market 
equilibrium is not necessarily efficient, due to the externalities created by loop flows. 
Intuitively, this result should still hold here, since the inclusion of uncertainty does not 
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change the fact that transmission investment may affect the flow of power along the lines for 
any given set of injections. 
We observe that if for each two lines L∈',ll , and for each node Nn∈ , investment 
in line l  does not affect the distribution factor 'lnα , that is, if ( )( ) 0* =∂∂ ∈lI
I Lvv
z
nα , then every 
efficient allocation can be decentralized by competitive prices, and the allocation in every 
Arrow-Debreu equilibrium is efficient. We can see that if an allocation 
( )( ) ( )( )( )ErLrOHPHsNnsnsn Iqc ∈∈== ll *,1** ,,  together with the Lagrangian multipliers sλ  and slμ  for 
L∈l  and OHPHs ,=  solve the social optimum problem (55), then ssNp λ= , 
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lαμλ  for Nn ,...,1=  and OHPHs ,= , and sst ll μ= , for L∈l  and 
OHPHs ,=  are the nodal and transmission prices that support the corresponding efficient 
allocation. Conversely, if ( ) ( ) ( )( ) OHPHsLsNnsns tpwtpw ,1 ,,,, =∈== ll  are prices that together with 
( )( ) ( )( )( )ErLrOHPHsNnsnsn Iqc ∈∈== ll *,1** ,,  constitute a competitive equilibrium, then sNs p=λ , and 
ss tll =μ  together with ( )( ) ( )( )( )ErLrOHPHsNnsnsn Iqc ∈∈== ll *,1** ,,  are a solution to the social optimum 
problem (55). 
However, in general the distribution factors are affected by investment in different 
lines. Hence the flow structure of the network is changed after the investment, as indicated 
by the term 
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αμ . This is the externality that causes the 
competitive allocations to be inefficient and the result that efficient allocations cannot be 
decentralized by means of competitive prices. So, we end up with the same conclusion as that 
from the model without uncertainty: the externality that causes market failure in the 
transmission investment market comes from the dependence of the distribution factors on 
investment. This externality exists as along as the investment affects the flow of power along 
the lines for a given set of injections. Obviously, the introduction of uncertainty does not 
change the basic result. Similarly, we can restore efficiency by imposing a unit tax of 
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on investment in line l  in state s for L∈l  and OHPHs ,= .  
Like before, we can extend this model with uncertainty to incorporate the case of grid 
expansion. The results should be the same.  
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CHAPTER 3.  TRANSMISSION INVESTMENT COST 
ALLOCATION WITHIN THE COOPERATIVE GAME 
FRAMEWORK 
3.1  Introduction 
In recent decades, the electricity market in the U.S. as well as in many other countries 
has experienced an unprecedented institution restructuring from heavy regulation to 
competition. The subject of transmission expansion is important and recognized as a complex 
problem in electricity restructuring (Hogan 2003). One of the major concerns is how 
transmission investment costs should be allocated. Due to economies of scale and network 
effects, there may be situations where many would benefit from a transmission expansion but 
no coalition is prepared to make the investment. In this case, a regulatory decision to approve 
the investment and allocate the costs is required. If no coalition of grid users were able to 
agree to pay for a grid expansion that appears to be beneficial for the system as a whole, any 
interested party could propose a project and an allocation of its costs among those grid users 
who would benefit (Hogan 1999). This paper gives some cost allocation options, motivated 
by cooperative games.   
Cooperative game theory arises as a most convenient tool to solve cost allocation 
problems and its application to the electricity industry has been growing in the literature. 
Contreras, Klusch and Yen (1998) and Contreras and Wu (2000) proposed a decentralized 
coalition formation and cost allocation procedure for transmission expansion planning, using 
the bilateral Shapley value and kernel, respectively. Zolezzi and Rudnick (2002) developed a 
new allocation method among the electric market participants, which is based mainly on the 
responsibility of the agents in the physical and economic use of the network, their rational 
behavior, the formation of coalitions, and cooperative game theory resolution mechanisms. 
Following that, Zolezzsi and Rudnick (2003) presented a transmission cost allocation method, 
based on cooperative game theory and transmission network capacity use by consumers.  
Different than previous work, this paper identifies the situation in which socially 
worthwhile transmission investment may not benefit every agent and applies cooperative 
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game theory to the allocation of transmission investment costs, which, as mentioned earlier, 
is of high significance and broad interest. We choose the cooperative game theory framework, 
because its solution mechanisms behave well in terms of fairness, efficiency and stability, 
qualities required for the correct allocation of transmission investment costs. Basically, the 
problem of transmission investment cost allocation can be formulated to a cooperative game. 
Then the well-known game theoretic solution concepts, such as the Shapley value, core and 
nucleolus can be used to solve the associated game. From these solutions, we can derive the 
allocation rules for the original cost allocation problem. We consider the bid-based, security-
constrained economic dispatch system, which is now widely practiced in different regions in 
the U.S. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. We start, in Section 3.2, with an 
example with a simple three-bus electricity transmission network, from which one can see 
how the bid-based, security-constrained system works and how comes the investment cost 
allocation problem. Section 3.3 defines the general electricity cost allocation problem and 
allocation rule. Two cost allocation rules are provided in Section 3.4, based on two important 
cooperative game theoretic solution concepts, namely the Shapley Value, and core, 
respectively. In Section 3.5, we give the relationship between the electricity cost allocation 
problem and the bankruptcy problem and propose a third allocation rule, using the concept of 
nucleolus. The last section is a brief summary of earlier conclusions and suggests potential 
research extensions. 
3.2  A Three-bus Example 
Let us start from an example with a three-bus transmission network as illustrated in 
Fig. 1. We focus on the day-ahead market corresponding to the specified hour h and suppress 
the hour h in our notation. The basic setting is as follows: The network consists of three 
interconnected nodes. The impedance is the same for all the three lines. For simplicity, 
assume that only the line connecting nodes 1 and 3 is constrained to carry no more than 200 
MW. The other two lines, in contrast, have extremely large capacities that they are never 
congested. Besides, assume that there is no voltage or thermal loss during the transmission. 
At each of the three nodes, there is a generator (or seller) that produces and sells electricity 
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and a consumer (or buyer) that buys and consumes electricity16. We use nS  for the seller and 
nB  for the buyer, at node n, for 3,2,1=n . This transmission system is operated and 
supervised by an independent system operator (ISO).  
 
Figure 1: A three-bus network 
Without loss of generality, we assume that the ISO is also the transmission owner 
(TO) of the transmission grid. The sellers and buyers in the market submit to the ISO sealed 
offers and bids, respectively, describing the price and quantity at which they are willing to 
sell or buy energy. The ISO determines the successful offers and bids and the market-
clearing price by maximizing the social surplus, allowing for the physical constraints. The 
auction results determine the unit commitment and dispatch of the physical units. The offers 
submitted by the three sellers are illustrated in Figures 2-4, respectively.  
The supply curve in Figure 2 means that the seller at node 1 can produce up to 300 
MWh at a cost of $5 per MWh and another 300 MWh at a cost of $10. Similar interpretations 
apply to the other two supply curves. Figures 5-7 describe the bids of the three consumers, 
respectively: 
 
                                                 
16 By the consumer, we actually mean any entity that purchases electricity from the system, such as the load serving entity 
(LSE). 
  
67
 
Figure 2: S1 
 
Figure 3: S2 
 
Figure 4: S3 
  
68
 
Figure 5: B1 
 
Figure 6: B2 
 
Figure 7: B3 
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For example, the demand curve in Figure 5 tells that buyer 1 is willing to pay $70 per 
MWh for up to 200 MWh and $50 per MWh for 100 more MWh. The other two demand 
curves can be interpreted in a similar way. The ISO maximizes the social surplus, given these 
offers and bids and the non-negativity, balancing and transmission constraints. In what 
follows, we consider both the unconstrained and constrained case. 
3.2.1 Unconstrained Case 
If there were no transmission constraint, the ISO solved the following problem 
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 (supply-demand balance) 
where )( nn cU is buyer n’s benefit or utility from consuming nc  amount of power and 
)( nn qC is seller n’s cost of generating nq  amount of power. Thus, the maximand 
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N
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)()(  is the social surplus, namely the difference between the social benefit 
and the social cost. The social surplus is maximized subject to the non-negativity and 
balancing constraints. Solving this problem for the three-bus example previously, we get the 
following generation and consumption quantities (in MWh):  
800,400,300,300,600,600 321321 ====== cccqqq  
The market clearing price is 29$/MW, which is the same at all busses. This price can 
be derived as the Lagrangian multiplier of the supply-demand balancing constraint. The 
social welfare is 600,265=ucSW (in $), in which the producer surpluses (or profits) for 
sellers 1, 2 and 3 are (in $): 900,12,1 =ucPS , 400,7,2 =ucPS  and 800,1,3 =ucPS , respectively 
and the consumer surpluses for buyers 1, 2 and 3 are (in $) : 400,16,300,10 ,2,1 == ucuc CSCS , 
and 800,216,3 =ucCS , respectively.  
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3.2.2 Constrained Case 
Now there is a flow constraint on line 1-3, i.e. the flow along this line can not exceed 
200 MW. Under the unconstrained transmission dispatch, the power flow on Line 1-3 is 
266.67 MW, which violates the transmission constraint. Therefore, the dispatch described in 
3.2.2 is not feasible in reality and the ISO has to take the line constraint into account when 
solving for the optimal dispatch. Therefore, the ISO solves the following problem:  
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Solving this new problem for our three-bus example, we get the quantities in the 
constrained case: 
800,400,300,450,500,550 321321 ====== cccqqq  
The constraint on line 1-3 is binding. In other words, line 1-3 is congested, which 
leads to different locational marginal prices (LMPs) at different nodes17. Specifically, the 
LMPs at node 1, 2 and 3 are 10, 20 and 30 (in $/MW), respectively18. Note that electricity at 
each node is bought and sold at the LMP of that node. Therefore, sellers 1 and 2 receive $10 
and $20, respectively for each MWh sold, and buyer 3 has to pay $30 for each MWh power 
consumed, regardless of where the power comes from. As a result, the total amount paid by 
the consumers exceeds the total amount received by the sellers. The difference between these 
two amounts is known as the congestion rent (denoted by K), collected by the ISO. In this 
case, the social welfare is divided into three components: consumer surpluses, producer 
surpluses and congestion rent, which take the following values (in $):  
                                                 
17 The LMP at any location is the incremental cost of serving one more increment (1 MW) of load at each location, given the 
actual dispatch, the constraints, and the participants’ offers/bids 
18 Let λ and μ  be the Lagrangian multiplier of balancing and flow constraint, respectively. Then the LMP at node 3 is equal 
to λ and the LMPs at node 1 and 3 are 3/2μλ −  and 3/μλ − , respectively. 
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Adding them up, we have that the social surplus in the constrained case (SWc) is $263,750, 
which is $1850 less than that in the unconstrained case. It means that the social surplus will 
increase by $1850 if the constraint is eliminated19. So, if the cost of eliminating the constraint 
is lower than $1,850, it is socially worthwhile to make the transmission investment that 
removes the constraint.  
The agents will benefit or suffer differently from the investment, although it might be 
good for society as a whole. From now on, we will change the indices for notational 
simplicity: 1— 1S , 2— 2S , 3— 3S , 4— 1B , 5— 2B , 6— 3B , and 7—ISO. Let iπ , for 7,...,1=i  
be the change in agent i’s welfare from the constrained to the unconstrained case. Then we 
have (in $): 
114001 =π , 54002 =π , 4503 −=π , 57004 −=π , 36005 −=π , 8006 =π , 60007 −=π  
These numbers say that if the constraint on line 1-3 is eliminated through 
transmission investment, sellers 1 and 2 and buyer 3 will be better off, while the other four 
agents, worse off. This three node example can be generalized to one with a larger, more 
complicated set of nodes and more agents. An investment project that enhances transmission 
capacity of the network may benefit society as a whole, but not every agent. Then a series of 
questions ensure. Who should make the beneficial investment? How should the investment 
cost be allocated? Intuitively, the beneficiaries should finance the investment and compensate 
the sufferers for their loss. In the following sections, we will formulate the situation into a 
cost allocation problem and characterize its allocation rules. 
3.3  Electricity Cost Allocation Problem and Allocation Rule 
For a given transmission network and a set { }nN ,...,2,1= of agents, we can define the 
problem of sharing or allocating transmission investment costs as follows: 
Definition 1: An electricity cost allocation problem is a pair ),( πC , where 
                                                 
19 Here we ignore the effect of capacity enhancement in line 1-3 has on the impedance of that line, nor the distribution 
factors of the network. Hence, the line impedances and distribution factors remain the same before and after the investment.  
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( ) nn R∈= ππππ ,...,, 21  and ∑
=
≤≤
n
i
iC
1
0 π . 
Here C is the cost of the transmission investment project and iπ , for ni ,...,1=  is agent i’s 
benefit from the investment. Note that iπ can be negative, meaning that agent i will suffer, 
rather than benefit from the investment.  
An allocation in the problem ),( πC is a vector ( )nxxx ,...,1= , such that Cxn
i
i =∑
=1
. 
The value ix is interpreted as agent i’s contribution to the financing of the cost C. An 
allocation is said to be individually rational if ( )nx ππ ,...,1≤ . The requirement iix π≤  for 
ni ,...,1=  means that if agent i benefits from the investment, her contribution should be no 
greater than her benefit; if she suffers from the investment, she has to be compensated for her 
loss. Given an allocation x, the corresponding vector of net benefit is x−π .  
Our task is to find reasonable cost allocations. Specifically, we are interested in 
reasonable allocation rules that associate an allocation to each electricity cost allocation 
problem.  
Definition 2: An allocation rule is a function f that maps each electricity cost allocation 
problem ),( πC to one or a set of its allocations. 
That is, given an electricity cost allocation problem, our rule should tell us how much each 
agent will end up paying. One of the possible rules can be the following:  
Example: The Head Tax Rule is the rule that maps each allocation problem ),( πC  to the 
allocation hta ),( πC = x where { }iix πλ,min= , ni ,...,1=∀ and 0≥λ is chosen such 
that Cx
n
i
i =∑
=1
. This allocation rule dictates that those whose welfare will be hurt by the 
investment should be fully compensated for their losses ( iix π= , if 0<iπ ), and those who 
will be better-off after the investment should contribute an equal amountλ to its financing, as 
long as no one pays more than her benefit, in which case she pays her full benefit. 
For the purpose of finding allocation rules, we will translate the electricity cost 
allocation problem into a cooperative game with transferable utility and then apply the well-
known game-theoretic solution concepts to the game to get allocation rules for the original 
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problem.  
Definition 3: A cooperative game (or a game in coalitional form) consists of  
1. a set N (the players), and 
2. a function Rv N →2: , such that ( ) 0=φv }):{2( NSSN ⊆= . 
A subset S of N is called a coalition, and v(S) is called the worth of the coalition S. Intuitively, 
v(S) represents the total amount of payoff that the coalition S can get by itself, without the 
help of the other players. For the electricity cost allocation scenario, we assume that each 
coalition can carry out the investment project as long as it pays the investment cost and 
compensates all the agents that will suffer from the project. The idea is that each sufferer has 
the veto power, unless she is fully compensated for her loss. Now we can formulate the 
cooperative game from the electricity cost allocation problem.  
Definition 4: Let ),( πC be an electricity cost allocation problem defined in Definition 1. The 
associated cooperative game is (N, v), where  
1. { }nN ,...,1=  is the set of players, and 
2. v(S) = }},0min{,0max{ ∑ ∑
∈ ∉
+−
Si Si
ii C ππ ,  NS ⊆∀ .                                                      
Condition 2 above means that a coalition S can always remain in the status quo, and hence 
get 0, or undertake the transmission investment after compensating the agents outside the 
coalition for the losses they might suffer.  
A payoff vector of the game is a vector ( )nyyy ,...,1=  with the element iy  
representing the payoff to player i or equivalently what player i will finally get. It will be 
recalled that the set of imputations of a cooperative game (N, v) is the set of payoff vectors y, 
such that 0≥y and∑
∈
=
Ni
i Nvy )( . Since },0max{)( ∑
∈
−=
Ni
i CNv π in our game, its set of 
imputations is the set of vectors 0≥y , such that ∑ ∑
∈ ∈
−=
Ni Ni
ii Cy },0max{ π . Every imputation 
y of the game (N, v) induces a cost allocation for the electricity cost allocation 
problem ),( πC in the way that yx −= π . 
Having the definitions above, we can apply some accepted game theoretic solution 
concepts to the game induced by the cost allocation problem and obtain the corresponding 
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cost allocations. Solution concepts associate payoff vectors with games. In many cases a 
solution concept associates several payoff vectors with a given game or none at all. 
3.4  Allocation Rules Based on the Shapley Value and Core 
In this section, we will find the allocation rules, using two game theoretic solution 
concepts, namely the Shapley value and the core. The former is single-valued and associates 
a unique payoff vector with each cooperative game. Let us first recall the definition of the 
Shapley value.  
Definition 5: Let },...,2,1{ nN = and GN be the set of all games whose player set is N. The 
Shapley value or value on N is a function NN RG →:φ  that satisfies the following 
conditions: 
1. (Symmetry condition): if i and j are substitutes20 in v, then ji vv )()( φφ = . 
2. (Null player21 condition): if i is a null player, then 0)( =ivφ . 
3. (Efficiency condition): ∑
=
=
n
i
i Nvv
1
)()(φ . 
4. (Additivity condition): iii wvwv )()())(( φφφ +=+ . 
iv)(φ , the i-th coordinate of the image vector )(vφ  is interpreted as the “power” of player i in 
the game v, or what it is worth to i to participate in the game. The four conditions that the 
Shapely value must satisfy are quite intuitive. Condition 1 necessitates that if two players 
have equal influence on any coalition without either of them originally, their payoff should 
be the same. Naturally, a player that has no influence at all should get nothing, which is what 
Condition 2 means. The efficient condition in 3 dictates that the total benefit should be fully 
distributed among the players. The last condition says that the Shapley value is an additive 
allocation rule. The Shapley value calculates a fair division of the utility, based on 
individuals’ contributions, among the members in a coalition. It can be considered as a 
                                                 
20 Substitutes: i and j, elements of N, are substitutes in v if for all S containing neither i nor j, {}( ) { }( )jSviSv ∪=∪ . 
21 An element i of N is called a null player if {}( ) ( )SviSv =∪  for all NS ⊆ . 
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weighted average of marginal contributions of a member to all the possible coalitions in 
which it may participate.  
For every N, there exists a unique Shapley value on GN, which can be calculated 
using the formula below. 
Theorem 1 (Shapley [1953]): ∑ −∪=
R
ii SviSvniv )](}{([)!/1()(ϕ , where R runs over all n! 
different orders on N, and Si is the set of players preceding i in the order R. 
This theorem enables us to solve for the Shapley value for any given cooperative game, 
although the calculation might be complicated sometimes. In fact, in some cases, the value 
can be more easily found using the definition itself, as we will see later.  
Another important concept of the solution to the cooperative game is the core, which 
is defined as follows. 
Definition 6: The core of the game (N, v) is the set of all imputations y, such that 
∑
∈
≤
Si
iySV )( for all NS ⊂ . 
Unlike the Shapley Value the core is not a single payoff vector, but a set of payoff vectors, 
which can be empty. The core of a cooperative game consists of all undominated allocations 
in the game. In other words, the core includes all allocations with the property that no group 
can do better by deserting the grand coalition.  
There is no general relationship between the two solution concepts described so far. 
The Shapley value may not be in the core, even when it is not empty. Intuitively the Shapley 
Value represents a reasonable compromise, whereas the core represents a set of payoff 
vectors which are, in a certain sense, stable.  
For each electricity cost allocation problem ),( πC , we can calculate the Shapley value 
and the core of the associated cooperative game (N, v). Then an allocation to the original 
electricity problem can be yx −= π where y is the Shapley value or an imputation vector in 
the core, depending on which solution concept we use.  
As an application, we adopt the method to the electricity cost allocation 
problem ),( πC  formulated from our three-bus example, where 1850 C ≥ , 114001 =π , 
54002 =π , 4503 −=π , 57004 −=π , 36005 −=π , 8006 =π , and 60007 −=π . The 
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associated cooperative game is (N, v), where }7,6,5,4,3,2,1{=N , and  
( ) { }
{ }
SNS
CC
CSv
∈⊆∀
−=−=
−−++=
6 2, 1, s.t. ,        
 18501850 ,0        
15750800540011400 ,0max
                             (1) 
( ) { }
{ }
SSNS
C
CSv
∉∈⊆∀
−=
−−+=
6 and ,2 1, s.t. ,        
1050 ,0        
15750540011400 ,0max
                                       (2) 
0)( =Sv  ∀ other NS ⊆                                                                 (3) 
3.4.1 Allocation Rule Based on the Shapely Value 
For calculation simplicity, let us further assume that C < 1050. Since players 3, 4, 5 
and 7 are null players in this game, their powers are all 0, i.e. 
0)()()()( 7543 ==== vvvv φφφφ . Players 1 and 2 are substitutes, so 21 )()( vv φφ = . By 
Theorem 1, we have that the power of buyer 3 is
3
800)( 6 =vφ . Then 
23
375,2
2
))()((
)()( 621
CvNvvv −=−== φφφ .  The corresponding allocation to the original 
electricity problem can then be derived as iii yx −= π  for Ni∈ and has the following values:  
}6000 ,
3
1600 ,3600 ,5700 ,450 ,
23
13825 ,
23
31825{ −−−−++= CCx  
At this allocation, sellers 1 and 2 and buyer 3 share the investment cost and fully 
compensate the others for their losses. Moreover, the more does one benefit from the 
investment, the more she would pay. Therefore, among the three beneficiaries, seller 1 pays 
the most, and buyer 3, the least.  
3.4.2 Allocation Rule Based on the Core 
Let { 765432,1 ,,,,, yyyyyyy } be a payoff vector for the players of the game. For it to 
be in the core, the payoff vector should satisfy the conditions specified in Definition 6, which 
can be simplified to the following:  
0,,,,, 765432,1 ≥yyyyyyy  
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Cvyy −=≥+ 1050)2 ,1(21  
Cvyyy −=≥++ 1850)6 ,2 ,1(621  
CNvyyyyyyy −==++++++ 1850)(7654321  
Then we get: 
Cyyyyyyyy −=++≤==== 1850 and 800 ,0 62167543  
Therefore, the core of the game is{ }0 , ,0 ,0 ,0 , , cba , where 8000 ≤≤ c , cCba −−=+ 1850 , 
and 0 , ≥ba . 
Because yx −= π , an allocation rule of this electricity cost allocation problem based 
on the core is given as follows: 
}6000,,3600,5700,450,,{ 621 −−−−= xxxx  
where CxxC +≤+≤+ 750,15950,14 21  and 8000 6 ≤≤ x . As is in 3.4.1, the investment 
cost and compensation for the sufferers should be allocated among 1S , 2S , and 3B  only. The 
most noticeable difference between the allocation rules in 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 is that the rule in 
3.4.1 maps the electricity problem to one single allocation, while 3.4.2 gives a set of 
allocations. In our example, the allocation based on the Shapley value is included in the set of 
allocations based on the core. Actually, the Shapley value is always in the core for the type of 
games we study in this paper, but it is not necessarily true for any arbitrary game22.  
More generally, for any electricity cost allocation problem, the allocation rules based 
on the Shapley Value and core both dictate that the agents that will benefit from the 
investment project should undertake the investment, finance it and compensate those who 
will suffer from it. The potential sufferers should be fully compensated such that they are 
neither better-off nor worse-off after the investment. 
                                                 
22 As is shown in 3.5, the electricity cost allocation problem is a bankruptcy problem, for which the Shapley value is always 
in the core. 
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3.5 Bankruptcy Problem and Allocation Rule Based on the 
Nucleolus 
So far, we have formulated the cooperative game associated with the electricity cost 
allocation problem and defined the allocation rules based on the Shapley value and core of 
the game. In this section, we find a third allocation rule by applying another solution concept, 
the nucleolus to the induced cooperative game. Like the Shapley value, the nucleolus is also 
a one point solution. Here is the interpretation behind the notion of the nucleolus. Given a 
payoff vector y  each coalition S looks at ( ) ( )SySv − , which represents the “complaint” of 
the coalition (it could be positive or negative). The higher the complaint the more strongly 
the coalition objects to y . Thus we want to minimize complaints under the feasibility 
constraint. We do so starting with the maximal complaint, i.e., we look at 
( ) ( )( ){ }SySv
NSy
−
⊆
maxmin . Then we minimize the next highest complaint when considering only 
the payoff vector that minimized the highest complaint, and so on. What we get is the 
lexicographic minimum of all complaints. It turns out that we are left with a unique payoff 
vector which is the nucleolus.  
The nucleolus has the virtue that it is always in the core when the core is non-empty. 
The drawback is that the calculation of the nucleolus is extremely complicated in general. 
Fortunately, the nucleolus is easy to find for some types of cooperative games. One of them 
is the game induced by the bankruptcy problem, whose definition is given below. Although 
its motivation is different, we will see that the bankruptcy problem and the electricity cost 
allocation problem are closely related. 
3.5.1 Bankruptcy Problem and Consistent Allocation 
Definition 7 (Aumann and Maschler (1985)): A bankruptcy problem is defined as a pair (E; 
d), where ( )nddd ,...,1= , ndd ≤≤≤ ...0 1 and nddE ++≤≤ ...0 1 .  
RE ∈  is the estate and ( ) nn Rdd ∈,...,1 denotes a vector of claims or debts. The condition 
nddE ++≤≤ ...0 1  means that the total value of the estate can not cover the total liability, 
hence the name “bankruptcy”.  
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 An allocation to the bankruptcy problem (E; d) is an n-tuple ),...,,( 21 nyyyy = of real 
numbers with Eyyy n =+++ ...21 . For each bankruptcy problem (E; d) there is an 
associated cooperative game (N, w), where },...,2,1{ nN =  and ( ) ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −= ∑
∉Si
idESw ,0max . 
The imputations to this game will give allocations to the corresponding bankruptcy problem. 
First think of a two-player bankruptcy problem )),(;( 21 ddE , One possible allocation 
can be found in the following way. Each claimant i concedes },0max{ idE −  to the other 
claimant j. The amount at issue is therefore },0max{},0max{ 21 dEdEE −−−− ; it is shared 
equally between the two claimants, and in addition, each claimant receives the amount 
conceded to her by the other one. Thus the total amount awarded to i is   
},0max{
2
},0max{},0max{ 21
ji dE
dEdEEy −+−−−−= , for 2,1, =ji and ji ≠  
We will say that the above division of E for claims 1d  and 2d  is prescribed by the Contested 
Garment (CG) principle. If one views the allocation as a function of E, one obtains such a 
process: Let 21 dd ≤ . When E is small, it is divided equally. This continues until each 
claimant has received 2/1d . Each additional dollar goes to the greater claimant, until each 
claimant has received all but 2/1d of her claim. Beyond that, each additional dollar is again 
divided equally. 
The CG principle generalized to a rule for the n-player bankruptcy problem 
)),...,(;( 21 ddE is called the coalitional procedure. Let ∑
∈
=
Ni
idD and assume that 
nddd ≤≤≤ ...21 . According to the coalitional procedure, we treat a given n-person problem 
in one of the following three ways, depending on the values of E and d: 
1. Divide E between {1} and {2, …, n} in accordance with the CG solution of a 2-person 
problem, and then use the (n-1)-person rule, to divide the amount assigned to the coalition 
{2, …, n} between its members.  
2. Assign equal awards to all creditors. 
3. Assign equal losses to all creditors.  
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Specifically, 1 is applied when
22
11 ndDEnd −≤≤ ; we use 2 when 
2
1ndE ≤  and 3 
when
2
1ndDE −≥ . 
This coalitional procedure (or CG principle for in 2-person case) generates an 
allocation to the bankruptcy problem. Given an allocation, if for all ji ≠ , the division of 
ji yy +  prescribed by the contested garment (CG) principle for claims ji dd ,  is ),( ji yy , this 
solution is called a consistent solution. That is, at a consistent solution, the redistribution 
between any two agents according to CG principle will yield exactly the same result. 
Aumann and Maschler (1985) show that each bankruptcy problem has a unique consistent 
solution, which is exactly the nucleolus of the corresponding cooperative game. And the 
coalitional procedure described above computes this consistent solution, or the nucleolus of 
the induced game.  
3.5.2 Electricity Cost Allocation Problem and Bankruptcy Problem 
Now we have known much about the bankruptcy problem. In what follows, we will 
show that our electricity cost allocation problem is closely related to the bankruptcy problem, 
so that we can apply our knowledge of the bankruptcy problem to the electricity problem to 
define its allocation rule.  
Observation: For each electricity cost allocation problem ),( πC , there is a bankruptcy 
problem (E; d), such that both problems induce the same cooperative game. 
Proof. Given ),( πC , define a bankruptcy problem (E; d), where ∑
=
−=
n
i
i CE
1
π and 
n
iid 1}),0(max{ == π . Obviously the cooperative games induced by the two problems have the 
same set of players, so what remains is to prove that the worth of each coalition is the same 
for the two games. The game associated with ),( πC  has the worth  
( ) }},0min{,0max{ ∑∑
∉∈
+−=
Si
i
Si
i CSv ππ , NS ⊆∀                       (4) 
The game associated with (E; d), where ∑
=
−=
n
i
i CE
1
π  and niid 1}),0(max{ == π  has the worth 
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( )
  },},0min{,0max{        
}},0max{},0max{},0min{,0max{        
},0max{,0max{
1
NSC
C
CSv
Si
i
Si
i
Si
i
Si
i
Si
i
Si
i
Si
i
n
i
i
⊆∀+−=
−++−=
−−=
∑∑
∑∑∑∑
∑∑
∉∈
∉∉∉∈
∉=
ππ
ππππ
ππ
     (5) 
The expression on the right of the last equation mark is exactly the same as the right-hand 
side in (4). Therefore, ),( πC and (E; d) induce the same cooperative game.                   (QED) 
Observation 1 is important, because it allows us to get allocations of the electricity 
cost allocation problems, a new type of problems by finding the solutions to the 
corresponding bankruptcy problems, which we are already very familiar with. According to 
this observation, each electricity cost allocation problem ),( πC  is associated with a 
bankruptcy problem 
∑
=
=−≡
n
i
n
iiin CddE
1
1,1 )}),0(max{;())...,(;( ππ                                      (6) 
In this problem, the total surplus ∑
=
−
n
i
i C
1
π  has to be divided among the agents. 
Applying the coalitional procedure, we will get the consistent allocation y for this problem. 
Then the allocation of the original electricity problem can be derived as x = π – y.  
3.5.3 Allocation Rule Based on the Nucleolus 
As an example, consider the class of electricity problems ( )( )21 ,, ππC  with only two 
agents. Without loss of generality, assume that 21 ππ ≥ . By the CG principle we get the 
allocation of surplus (y1, y2) for the problem in (6): 
)
2
,
2
( 21
CC −− ππ , if C≥21 ,ππ  
)
2
,
2
( 221
πππ +−C , if C≥1π  and C<≤ 20 π  
)0,( 21 C−+ππ , if C≥1π  and 02 <π  
)
2
,
2
( 2121 CC −+−+ ππππ , if C<≤ 11 ,0 ππ  
Each pair of numbers in the parentheses above represent the allocation of the total 
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surplus between the two players. Specifically, if both agents’ individual benefits from the 
investment exceed the investment cost, the cost will be equally distributed between the 
agents and each agent will end up getting her original benefit less half of the investment cost. 
If both agents benefit from the investment, but one benefits more than the cost and the other, 
less than the cost, the latter will get half of her benefit and the rest will go to the pocket of the 
former. Another possible case is that one of the agents has a benefit higher than the 
investment cost, while the other agent will suffer from the investment. In that case, the 
beneficiary has to pay the investment cost and fully compensate the sufferer for her loss, such 
that the sufferer’s welfare will be exactly the same as that before the investment. So the 
beneficiary will end up with all the social surplus. The social surplus will be equally divided 
between the two agents, if both of them benefit from the investment, but each has the benefit 
lower than the investment cost.  
Having the allocation of surplus, we can obtain the cost allocation of the electricity 
problem: 
)
2
,
2
( CC , if C≥21 ,ππ ; 
)
2
,
2
( 22
ππ−C , if C≥1π  and C<≤ 20 π ; 
),( 22 ππ−C , if C≥1π  and 02 <π ; 
  
)
2
,
2
( 1221 CC +−+− ππππ , if C<≤ 21 ,0 ππ . 
Now we define the electricity CG principle for the 2-player electricity cost allocation 
problem: 
1. If one player suffers from the transmission investment, e.g. 02 <π , she will receive the 
full amount of her loss 2π , or in other words, pay the negative amount of her loss. The 
investment cost plus the compensation for the sufferer 2π−C will be defrayed by the 
beneficiary.  
2. If both players benefit from the transmission investment, i.e. 0, 21 ≥ππ , the cost that 
player i will pay is 
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)max(
2
),0max(),0max( 21
ji C
CCCx πππ −+−−−−=  
for ji ≠ . This formula dictates such a process: No one will pay more than her benefit, so 
each player i needs to pay at least ),0max( jC π− , imposed by the other player j. The amount 
at issue is therefore ),0max(),0max( 21 ππ −−−− CCC .It is shared equally between the two 
players. Plus the amount imposed on her, the total cost player i has to pay will be 
)max(
2
),0max(),0max( 21
jC
CCC πππ −+−−−− .   
Note that the electricity CG principle described above is monotonic, in the sense that 
for fixed benefits (or losses) 21 ,ππ , each of the two payments is non-decreasing in the 
investment cost C. That is, no one will end up paying less if the investment cost increases.  
For the general n-player electricity problem, the cost allocation can be derived from x 
= π – y, where y is the consistent allocation of the corresponding bankruptcy problem in (6), 
or equivalently the nucleolus of the associated cooperative game. Let us call the rule the 
electricity coalitional procedure. We will show shortly that the allocation prescribed by this 
procedure is a consistent allocation in the electricity cost allocation context. That is, at this 
allocation ),...,( 21 xx , for all ji ≠ , the division of ji xx +  determined by the electricity CG 
principle for claims iπ , jπ  is still ),( ji xx .  
Proposition 1: The electricity coalitional procedure yields the consistent allocation for all 
electricity cost allocation problems. 
Proof. Let ),...,( 21 xx  be the allocation prescribed by the electricity coalitional procedure of 
the electricity problem )),...,(,( 1 nC ππ . Let ),...,( 1 nyy  be the consistent allocation of the 
corresponding bankruptcy problem )}),0(max{;( 1
1
n
ii
n
i
i C =
=
∑ − ππ . We must have iii yx −= π , 
for i=1,…,n. We need to show that ),( ji xx is the allocation from the CG principle of the 
electricity problem )),...,(,( 1 nji xx ππ+  for all ji ≠ . Note this 2-player problem is 
equivalent to the 2-person bankruptcy problem ))),0max(),,0((max(;( jiji yyyy + . 
Consistency implies that the allocation to this problem dictated by the CG principle is 
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),( ji yy . So the allocation of the electricity problem )),...,(,( 1 nji xx ππ+  prescribed by the 
electricity CG principle is ),( ji xx .                                                                                  (QED) 
Then does the electricity problem have a unique consistent allocation, as does the 
bankruptcy problem? The answer is yes.  
Proposition 2: Each electricity cost allocation problem has a unique consistent allocation.  
Proof. First we prove that there is at most one consistent solution. If there were more, we 
could find consistent solutions x and z, and players i and j, with ii xz > , jj xz < , and 
jiji xxzz +≥+ . Consistency implies that if only i and j are involved, the CG principle 
allocates jz  to j when the total cost is ji zz + , and jx  when it is ji xx + . Since 
jiji xxzz +≥+ , the monotonicity of the CG principle then implies jj xz ≥ , contradicting 
jj xz < .  
Second we show that there is at least one consistent solution. This holds, since we 
already know one, the allocation based on the nucleolus of the induced cooperative game. 
                  (QED) 
Because the allocation based on the nucleolus of the corresponding cooperative game 
is consistent, and the electricity problem has only one consistent allocation, it is safe to say 
that the nucleolus-based allocation is the unique consistent allocation. 
Now let us apply the rule to the three-bus cost allocation problem earlier. The 
problem is equivalent to a bankruptcy problem (E; d), where 01850 ≥−= CE and d = 
{11400, 5400, 0, 0, 0, 800, 0}. The consistent solution to this bankruptcy problem is  
y = { 765432,1 ,,,,, yyyyyyy }, where 07543 ==== yyyy ; If ,650≤C  then y6 = 400, y1 = y2 
=
2
1450 C− ; If 650>C , then y1 = y2 = y6 =
3
1850 C− . So the allocation rule to the original 
electricity problem is ),...,,( 21 nxxxx = , where 4503 −=x , 57004 −=x , 36005 −=x , and 
60007 −=x ; and if 650≤C , 2
21350
1
Cx −= , 
2
9350
2
Cx −= , and 4006 =x ; if 
650>C
3
32350
1
Cx += , 
3
14350
2
Cx += , and 
3
550
6
Cx += .  
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Similar to the allocation rules defined in Section 3.4, this rule dictates that the agents 
who will suffer from the investment should be fully compensated and that all the cost of 
investment plus compensation should be shared by the agents who will benefit.  
3.6  Conclusions 
To sum up, we have defined rules for allocating electricity transmission investment 
cost on the basis of three different solution concepts of the cooperative game, namely the 
Shapley value, the core and the nucleolus. These rules give reasonable allocations for the 
electricity cost allocation problem. The central point in each rule is that the potential 
beneficiaries of transmission investment should pay to get benefits and the potential sufferers, 
be compensated for their losses. Note that the allocations rules we propose provide options 
for electricity cost allocation in the absence of any mechanism. They tell what we should do 
in theory, and hence provide a benchmark, against which the allocation methods in reality 
can be compared to see if they are proper or need to be improved upon. One can not say 
which rule is the best and which is the worst.  
In this paper, we do not consider the possibility of the agents gaming against the 
system or any uncertainty. Nor do we incorporate the dynamic aspects such as the market 
entry in the long run. With these things incorporated, the calculation of the benefits and 
losses of transmission investment would be more complicated. But the allocation rules we 
derive here are still applicable, as long as we can figure out the benefits and losses.  
The allocation rules presented in this paper also apply to the situation with 
uncertainty, as long as we can identify the benefit or loss from the transmission investment 
for each agent. The difference is that in the uncertainty case, expected benefits and losses 
rather than deterministic ones might be used. The methods for determining the expected 
benefits and losses are seen in the literature. 
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CHAPTER 4.  EVALUATING THE EFFICIENCY OF 
FINANCIAL TRANSMISSION RIGHTS AUCTIONS: 
EVIDENCE FROM THE U.S. MIDWEST ENERGY REGION 
4.1  Introduction 
In March 2005, the Midwest Independent System Operator (MISO) officially adopted 
the Wholesale Power Market Platform (WPMP) proposed by U.S. Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC) in April 2003. One of the important features of FERC's 
WPMP design is to help alleviate the transmission congestion problems by issuing financial 
transmission rights (FTRs). By construction, an FTR is a financial contract that entitles the 
holder to a stream of revenues (or charges) based on the difference between the hourly day-
ahead locational marginal price (LMP) at the sink and source nodes. Due to congestion on 
transmission lines, day-ahead LMPs can be very volatile, and FTRs make a hedging 
instrument against the price risks. In principle, market participants could reduce the price 
uncertainty by purchasing FTRs for a specified amount of MWs on the paths of the 
transmission grid that they anticipate to be congested during a given period of time23. 
But in real practice, to what extent FTRs have performed in helping market 
participants hedge transmission congestion exposure in the new Midwest wholesale power 
market is still unclear. Moreover, is the current FTRs market efficient in terms of having the 
clearing FTR prices match closely with agents' expectations about financial loss caused by 
transmission congestions? In this study, we will address these two questions using the 
publicly available MISO FTR auction data and historical LMP data. 
As far as we know, no empirical work up to now has been done to analyze the MISO 
FTR market. Even for a broader geographic range, only a handful few studies have been 
conducted to investigate the empirical aspects of FTR market in other regions such as New 
York. Adamson and Englander (2005) examined the efficiency of the New York 
                                                 
23 FTRs are available not only for physical paths. They can be defined between any two nodes in the grid. 
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transmission congestion contract (TCC) market24. They used monthly TCC auction prices 
and congestion revenues between November 1999 and April 2003. A two-stage modeling 
approach was adopted to analyze the data. In the first stage, they used the time series ARCH-
ARMA model to forecast the mean and variance of spot prices (congestion rents). Then in 
the second stage, a simple linear model was proposed to regress TCC auction prices on the 
predicted mean and variance of spot prices from the first stage of modeling. From the results, 
they concluded that the New York TCC auctions were highly inefficient, even after allowing 
for risk aversion among bidders in the auctions. 
Siddiqui et al. (2005) carried out another empirical study on the New York TCC 
market based on annual TCC auctions in years 2000 and 2001. They found that although 
TCCs appeared to provide a potentially effective hedge against volatile congestion rents, the 
prices paid for TCCs were systematically different from the resulting congestion rents. Their 
conclusion was that the unreasonably high risk premiums paid for the TCCs suggested an 
inefficient market and that the possible explanations were lack of liquidity in TCC markets 
and the difference between TCC feasibility requirements and actual energy flows. However, 
these results held only under the assumption that market participants are all risk-neutral. 
Risk-averse agents, instead, may pay for TCCs the amounts more than the expected 
congestion charges. Therefore, the deviation of TCC payments from resulting congestion 
revenues did not necessarily indicate market inefficiency. 
In their follow-up work (Siddiqui et al. 2006), they re-analyzed the New York TCC 
data, taking into account possible risk aversion of market participants. Instead of using a 
linear model, they employed three different concave "utility functions" and fitted nonlinear 
regressions to the TCC payments and revenues data25. Their results showed that market 
participants were only slightly risk averse (or even risk seeking, depending on the utility 
function employed). Thus, risk aversion by itself could not fully explain the systematic 
divergence between the TCC prices and congestion rents. The authors concluded that it was 
the very design of these markets, rather than the behavior of market participants that led to 
the observed discrepancy between prices and revenues. 
                                                 
24 TCC: Transmission Congestion Contract, is one implemented form of FTR. 
25 We put question marks on the way Siddiqui et al. (2006) use "utility" functions in their regression specifications in that the 
direct substitution of the FTR prices in the form of concave utility function is not justified. 
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In spite of their original empirical work in evaluating the FTR auction market, we 
would like to point out a somewhat subtle and yet critical problem in Siddiqui et al. (2005) 
and (2006). That is, in these two papers, they treat the ex-post realized data as if they were 
ex-ante to match their empirical methods without stating clearly the underlying assumptions 
and their justifications for doing so. Given the situation that most of the ex-ante data are 
difficult or even impossible to obtain (confidentiality issue for example), one contribution of 
our paper is to try to state clearly the underlying assumptions we make to bridge the 
inconsistency between ex-ante method and ex-post data, and provide some theoretical 
foundations to the empirical methods we use. 
In our study, we focus on the FTR market in the Midwest energy region (MISO), 
which has never been investigated empirically in the literature. Compared with the other FTR 
markets such as New York's, the MISO FTR market has a much shorter history. The scarcity 
of available data with MISO poses a great challenge to reaching any complete conclusion 
about this emerging market. Unavoidably, we need to make assumptions in order to analyze, 
to the best extent, the data we could obtain. Although some of the assumptions cannot be 
tested for the moment due to insufficient data, we will be able to check for validity of these 
assumptions once more data become available. Through our analysis, we find a number of 
stylized facts as well as evidence of the performance and efficiency of the MISO FTR market. 
In addition, we make suggestions about improving data collections by MISO or other 
research entities, so that more in-depth studies could be carried out in future to evaluate and 
monitor this huge market. Our work is original in that no one has ever conducted any 
empirical study on this new market. Besides, our work is not restricted to the partial analysis 
due to limited data, but sheds light on what needs to be done to make the data more complete 
and meaningful. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides some background 
information about the MISO energy and FTR auction markets. In section 4.3, we review the 
underlying theory of hedging and risk preferences on which our analysis is based. Section 4.4 
provides a detailed description of the data. The empirical methods employed and 
assumptions are discussed in section 4.5. In section 4.6, we present and interpret our results. 
Finally, the concluding remarks are given in section 4.7. 
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4.2  MISO Energy and FTR Markets 
Founded on February 12, 1996, MISO is an independent and non-profit organization 
whose primary roles are to provide equal access to the transmission system and ensure 
reliable and efficient electric system in a competitive wholesale power market in the Midwest 
region. Currently MISO is managing transmission operations for all or part of 15 U.S. states 
plus Manitoba province in Canada. 
 
Figure 1: The current MISO service territory 
(Source: MISO, http://www.midwestiso.org/page/About%20MISO) 
 
Figure 1 shows the current MISO operation territory. Since April 2005, MISO has 
been operating a day-ahead energy market, a real-time energy market and an FTR market. 
The day-ahead market is a forward market in which hourly LMPs are calculated for each 
hour of the next operating day. According to MISO's Market Concepts Study Guide (MISO 
2005c), the day-ahead market is cleared using the security-constrained unit commitment 
(SCUC) and security-constrained economic dispatch (SCED) algorithms to satisfy energy 
demand bid and supply offer requirements. To be specific, the objective in clearing the day-
ahead market is to minimize the costs of day-ahead energy procurement over the 24-hour 
dispatch horizon based on the offers and bids, subject to network constraints and resource 
operating constraints. The results of the day-ahead market clearing include hourly LMP 
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values and hourly demand and supply quantities, which are posted on MISO's market portal 
on 1700 hours EST. The real-time energy market, in contrast, is an instant balancing market 
in which the LMPs are calculated every five minutes, based on MISO dispatch instructions 
and actual system operations. These two markets operate in a coordinated sequence and are 
settled separately. In the settlement of the day-ahead market each hourly MW injection is 
paid the day-ahead LMP at its node and withdrawals are charged the day-ahead LMP at their 
respective nodes. The day-ahead LMPs are also used to establish the settlement value of 
FTRs and bilateral transactions. The real-time settlement is based on actual hourly quantity 
deviations from the day-ahead scheduled quantities and on real-time prices integrated over 
the hour. Any deviation in the quantity from the day-ahead schedule (including bilateral 
transactions) is charged or paid real-time LMPs. 
4.2.1  LMP Components 
Since FTRs crucially depend on locational marginal prices (LMPs), it is important to 
take a close examination on the LMP and its components. By definition, LMP at any given 
pricing location is the minimum incremental cost of servicing one additional unit of demand 
at that location under the constraints of production, congestion and transmission losses. 
LMPs vary by time and location. Variability of LMPs is due to the physical constraints, 
congestion and losses. For each node, MISO determines three separate components of its 
LMP, namely the marginal energy component (MEC), marginal congestion component 
(MCC) and marginal loss component (MLC). MEC is the LMP of the reference node, so is 
the same for all the nodes. MCC and MLC of a certain node represent the marginal cost of 
congestion and marginal cost of losses, respectively at that node relative to the reference 
node.  
nnrn MLCMCCMECLMP ++=  
rr MECLMP =  
where r is the reference node and n is any node other than the reference one. 
 Of the three LMP components, rMEC  is calculated as the marginal cost of energy at 
the reference node r, so is determined by the cost functions of the generators at that node. 
The congestion component nMCC  is calculated as follows: 
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where K is the number of thermal or interface transmission constraints (also called flowgates), 
nkGSF  is the shift or distribution factor for the generation at node n on flowgate k and kFSP  
is the shadow price of the thermal limit on flowgate k. Intuitively, nkGSF  is the proportion of 
each MW injected at node n and withdrawn at the reference node r, and kFSP  is the cost 
saved from one MW increase in the capacity of flowgate k26. In the Midwest market, 
congestion is handled financially through the MCC of the LMP, and the congestion revenue 
from holding the FTR is determined by the difference in MCCs. 
 nMLC  is calculated using the equation 
rnn MECDFMLC ×−= )1(  
where nDF  is the delivery factor for node n to the reference node. nDF  is equal to 
nG
L
∂
∂−1 , 
where L is system losses and nG  is the amount of power injected at node n. Therefore, 
nG
L
∂
∂  
is the change in system losses due to an incremental change in the power injection at node n 
holding everything else constant.  
4.2.2 Overview of MISO FTR Acquisition 
FTRs are tradable financial instruments that allow market participants to hedge 
against the cost and uncertainty that may arise from congestion in the transmission grid. The 
FTR holders are entitled to a stream of revenues or charges based on the congestion over the 
FTR path. FTRs are used in the day-ahead market only and do not apply to the real-time 
market. They do not protect market participants from congestion charges related to 
scheduling power in the real-time market or deviating from the day-ahead schedule. Nor do 
they hedge against transmission loss charges. Besides, FTRs are independent of the physical 
power dispatch. The FTR holder has the financial right to the congestion between two 
specified nodes regardless of the actual energy deliveries. 
                                                 
26 According to the industry convention, the effect of losses is ignored in determining GSFs. 
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An FTR is specified by its source and sink, the MW amount, the term for which the 
FTR is in effect, the time period (peak or off-peak hours), and whether the FTR is an 
obligation or option. FTR options are currently not available in the MISO market. An FTR 
obligation grants the holder the right to collect, for each MW of FTR, the congestion rent 
accumulated from the source to the sink for every hour during the effective period. The 
congestion rent is determined by the difference between the congestion components in the 
day-head LMPs at the sink and source. Therefore, an FTR obligation can have a positive or 
negative economic value, depending on the actual congestion pattern between the source and 
sink on which the FTR is defined. During the hours when the congestion component at the 
sink is greater than the congestion component at the source, the FTR yields a positive 
revenue to the holder. If, instead, the congestion occurs from the sink to the source, the 
holder of the FTR will have to pay MISO an amount equal to the congestion rent in the 
congested direction, or equivalently receive a negative revenue. 
In the Midwest, market participants can acquire FTRs through allocations (annual and 
monthly), auctions (annual and monthly) and the secondary market. FTRs are first allocated 
in the annual allocation based on existing entitlements from transmission service reservations 
and grandfathered agreements. The annual FTR auction is held right after the annual 
allocation and prior to the beginning of each year for the subsequent four seasons27. In this 
auction, market participants can submit offers to sell or bids to buy FTRs and MISO 
determines the winning sellers and buyers. In order to be eligible for the annual auction, the 
FTR must be valid for the entire period of the seasons in the auction. A monthly allocation is 
performed for each operating month to come. Those FTRs eligible in the initial allocation 
that did not receive their full entitlement in FTR awards can be re-considered in this monthly 
allocation process. Then after the monthly allocation takes place, the monthly auction is 
conducted. Any FTR eligible for the monthly auction must be valid for the entire month in 
the auction. The exact timeline for the MISO monthly FTR allocations and auctions are given 
in Appendix A for a sample month (August 2005). There is also a secondary market for 
buying and selling FTRs. The FTR allocations are irrelevant to our research purpose in this 
                                                 
27 The four seasons are: (i) Winter: December, January, February; (ii) Spring: March, April, May; (iii) Summer: June, July, 
August; (iv) Fall: September, October, November. 
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paper, as there is no market or price for the allocation. Therefore, we do not consider the 
allocations in evaluating the market performance. In both the annual and monthly auctions, 
FTRs are sold and bought at the market clearing prices, the determination of which will be 
elaborated later. However, the data for the annual allocations are not sufficient since MISO 
has only adopted FERC's WPMP design since March 2005. In addition, a time interval of 
three months may be too long for discerning any change or trend in this market during the 
one-year period. Therefore, a monthly basis is proper for our research purpose. Although the 
secondary market is also relevant to our study, we have to ignore it, because little 
information is available about it. In all, considering relevance and availability, we finally 
choose to focus on the monthly FTR auctions and ignore the possible effects of other means 
to obtain FTRs. 
4.2.3 MISO Monthly FTR Auctions 
MISO conducts monthly FTR auctions for two purposes: (1) to allow MISO to sell 
FTRs for the adjusted monthly FTR capability of the market footprint, and (2) to facilitate the 
buying and selling of existing FTRs between market participants. Market participants buy 
from or sell to the available "pool" of system FTR capacity. All FTRs at the monthly auction 
have a term of one month beginning on the first day of the month following the auction. 
Market participants must submit their offers or bids to MISO during the monthly bidding 
period and MISO posts the auction results no later than 5 business days before the start of the 
subject month (see Appendix A for a more detailed MISO FTR allocation and auction 
timeline for a sample month - August 2005). Each monthly auction consists of two separate 
auctions: one for the peak period and the other for the off-peak period. Peak is the period of 
time ending 0600 hours Eastern Standard Time (EST) to 2200 hours EST on weekdays 
excluding holidays28. Off-peak is all periods not classified as peak. The purchaser of a peak 
(off-peak) FTR from the monthly auction is entitled to the aggregate congestion rents of the 
peak (off-peak) hours during the whole month. 
FTR bidders are responsible for submitting a bid that indicates the following: 
1. Type of FTR (obligation or option) 
                                                 
28 These holidays are specified by North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC). 
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2. FTR source and sink 
3. Maximum MW quantity desired 
4. Maximum acceptable price, in $/MW 
5. Period (peak or off-peak) 
Similarly, FTR sellers should submit an offer including the above items 1 through 5 
except that item 3 now becomes the maximum MW quantity offered instead of desired. 
Given the offers and bids for each monthly auction, MISO determines the winners (traders 
that get cleared, i.e., the infra-marginal traders) as well as FTR clearing quantities and 
clearing prices by solving a linear programming problem. Specifically, it maximizes the 
value of FTRs bought minus FTRs sold by auction participants subject to simultaneous 
feasibility constraints with "n-1" security constraints. All comparable FTRs are sold at the 
same market clearing price expressed in $/MW, which is calculated as the difference in the 
shadow price of the power flow balance constraint at the FTR source and sink in the FTR 
auction linear programming problem above. It can be interpreted as the negative of the 
marginal change in the objective function value due to an infinitesimal change in the flow 
from the FTR source to the sink. It is worth noting that the FTR clearing price can be 
negative, which means that the market participants who buy the FTR will receive money 
from MISO whereas those who sell the FTR will pay money to MISO. This usually happens 
when the particular line associated with this FTR is anticipated to be congested in the 
direction opposite to that specified by the FTR. 
4.3 Theory 
In this section, we first illustrate, through several examples, the role of FTRs in 
hedging against risks caused by the volatile location marginal prices (LMPs). In doing so, we 
consider two cases: electricity transaction scheduled on bilateral agreements and electricity 
transaction purely via the marked-based power pool. Then we demonstrate the relationship 
between the expected revenue from holding FTRs and the agent's willingness to pay to get 
them for both risk-neutral and risk-averse agents. 
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4.3.1 Hedging Role of FTRs 
LMPs in the electricity wholesale market provide the right incentives for generation 
and consumption, but also create a need to hedge the price changes. This leads to the interest 
in FTRs. Electricity transactions are usually settled through bilateral schedules or via the 
market-based power pool. In either case, FTRs provide a hedge against the congestion charge 
by reimbursing the holders part or all of the charge. How FTR works as a hedging instrument 
is illustrated through following several examples29. 
 
Figure 2: Bilateral contract with no congestion 
Let us first consider the case of bilateral agreements. If there were no transmission 
congestion, it is well justified to treat all production and consumption as if they took place in 
the same location since both buyer and seller are settled with the same price, which is the 
single equilibrium price in the market. Then the natural arrangement is to contract for 
differences against the equilibrium price. As depicted in Figure 2, a GENCO (G) and an LSE 
(L) are attached to node 1 and node 2, respectively. The two nodes do not have to be directly 
connected by a transmission line, so we use the dashed between them. The nodes and lines 
can be only part of a larger network, which is not drawn in the figure. Suppose G and L agree 
on a price of Bp  ($/MWh) for trading a fixed quantity of electricity q MWs at a specific hour. 
If there is no congestion in the network in this hour, the prices (or more precisely LMPs) at 
all nodes would turn out to be the same, hence denoted by a common price LMP. G will then 
sell electricity to the market at LMP and L will buy electricity from the market at LMP. Note 
that the q MWs that L purchases do not have to be produced by G, and the electricity that G 
                                                 
29 For simplicity, we do not consider transmission losses in our illustrative examples. 
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generates may be bought by other LSEs. So the arrows indicate the direction of the contract 
path. If BpLMP > , under the contract, G owes L BpLMP −  for each of the q MWs over this 
hour. In the opposite, if LMPpB > , L owes G LMPpB −  for each of the q MWs over this 
hour. This is the so-called contract for difference (CFD), which locks the actual transaction 
price at Bp  for both G and L and provides a perfect hedge against the price risk. Therefore, 
in the absence of congestion, a bilateral arrangement between the GENCO and the LSE can 
capture the effect of aggregate movements in the market, as the single market price gets up or 
down over time. 
 
Figure 3: Bilateral contract with congestion 
Most of the time, however, there is congestion somewhere in the transmission 
network. In that case, the price will differ depending on the location and G and L may no 
longer face the same price. This situation is illustrated in Figure 3. Let 1LMP  and 2LMP  be 
the locational marginal price at node 1 and 2, respectively and 21 LMPLMP ≠  due to the 
congestion. Also let Bp  be the bilaterally agreed contract price between G and L. Then at the 
settlement G will sell electricity to the market for 1LMP  and L will buy electricity from the 
market for 2LMP . If 21 LMPpLMP B << , then L pays BpLMP −2  more than the contracted 
price and needs to be compensated for the excessive payment. On the other hand, G receives 
1LMPpB −  less than the contracted price, so also needs to be compensated. Obviously, it is 
impossible to satisfy both parties only through the CFD and something else is needed to 
complement the CDF. 
Still consider the situation in Figure 3. Now suppose that apart from the CFD, G may 
obtain an FTR of q MWs defined from node 1 to node 2. The FTR entitles G to the difference 
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in the LMPs between the two nodes, i.e. 12 LMPLMP −  for that hour. L pays 2LMP  for the 
power. The settlement system in turn pays G 1LMP  for the power supplied. Thanks to the 
FTR, G ends up receiving 2LMP  for each MWs sold, and L ends up paying 2LMP  for each 
MW bought. In this sense, we come back to the previous situation in which the price is the 
same at all nodes, and the CFD will work out now.  If BpLMP >2 , G will compensate L for 
its excessive payment BpLMP −2  according to the CFD. If BpLMP <2 , G will be 
compensated for the loss 2LMPpB −  by L. As a result, no matter how the LMPs change, the 
transaction would be effectively settled at the deterministic, bilaterally agreed price Bp . On 
the other hand, L can also buy the same FTR and the result will be the same. The example 
indicates that in the presence of transmission congestion,   an FTR together with a CFD can 
provide full hedge against the risk associated with the LMPs. The function of FTRs in the 
scenario of bilateral contract actually lies in equalizing the price that the selling and buying 
parties face, which provides the condition for the CFD to be workable. The FTR provides 
hedge against locational price risks, while the CFD, against temporal price risks. In this 
example, the FTR together with CFD provides a perfect hedge for both parties, because the 
quantity of FTRs obtained exactly matches the contracted quantity of electricity. If G or L 
buys the FTR for an amount less than the contracted quantity of electricity, they will only 
have partial coverage. 
In summary, a seller and a buyer entering into a bilateral transaction of electricity 
between two nodes can always hedge against the price risk by using the FTR and CFD jointly.  
Now let us come to the case with no bilateral schedules. That is, each GENCO simply 
injects electricity to the power pool and gets the LMP at its own node for each MW injected. 
Each LSE withdraws electricity from the same power pool and pays the LMP at its own node 
for each MW withdrawn. Hence a GENCO does not know or care about where its power is 
withdrawn and who actually buys the power it has produced. Similarly, an LSE does not 
know where the power it buys comes from and who generates it. This is different from the 
transaction under a bilateral contract in which the seller and the buyer as well as the injection 
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and ejection nodes are designated and the transaction price is predetermined30. In the bilateral 
contract case, a combination of the FTR and CFD can provide a perfect hedge and make the 
payment and revenue nonrandom. Without a bilateral contract, however, it is not obvious to a 
market participant between which two nodes she pays the congestion charge. Hence she does 
not know for sure between which two nodes she should obtain the FTR to hedge the potential 
congestion. We can see this from the following example as depicted in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4: Transaction via a power pool with congestion 
This figure looks similar to Figure 3, but notice that only the q MWs injection of G is 
given. G does not know where these q MWs would be withdrawn or through what paths they 
would be transited. G only knows that it would get 1LMP  for each MW it produces. 1LMP  is 
volatile and fluctuates with the generation, loads and congestion patterns. G is exposed to the 
price risk and might want to hedge against it. Suppose that LMP₂, for some reason, is 
relatively stable and does not change much31. If G purchases an FTR of q MWs from node 1 
to node 2, it would get 2121 )( LMPLMPLMPLMP =−+  for each MW generated. In this sense, 
holding the FTR reduces G's price uncertainty by making its revenue less volatile. If 2LMP  is 
virtually nonrandom, then the FTR provides a perfect hedge for G. If 2LMP  is also random, 
but is much more stable than LMP₁, then the FTR provides a non-perfect partial hedge. To 
reduce its revenue uncertainty, G could effectively associate its revenue with 2LMP  by 
holding the FTR from node 1 to node 2. 
                                                 
30 Though in the case of bilateral transaction, the q MWs purchased by the LSE may not be the same q MWs that GENCO 
produces, either. 
31 This might occur at a hub which consists of a set of nodes and whose LMP is derived from the average of the LMPs of 
those nodes. 
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This is not the only choice for the hedging. In fact, G can choose a set of FTRs 
(portfolio of FTRs) to achieve the same result. Let us take another example with a three-node 
network in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5: The three-node electric network example 
In this example, the only generator G is located at node 1 and the only LSE L is 
located at node 2. For computational simplicity, assume that each line has the same 
impedance. Then of each MW injected at node 1, 
3
2 , 
3
1  and 
3
1  will move along line 1, line 2 
and line 3, respectively. Clearly, G will have a revenue of 1LMPq×  from injecting q MWs of 
electricity at node 1. To hedge against the congestion charge, G may obtain q MWs of FTR 
defined from node 1 to node 2. Then G's total revenue will be 
2121 )( qLMPLMPLMPqLMPq =−×+× . As mentioned earlier, if 2LMP  is nonrandom, then 
the FTR provides G with a perfect hedge. This is not the only way to achieve the 
deterministic revenue 2qLMP . An alternative could be that G obtains a portfolio of FTRs 
with q
3
2  MWs of FTR from node 1 to node 2,  q
3
1  MWs of FTRs from node 1 to node 3 
and q
3
1  MWs of FTRs from node 3 to node 2. G will again end up with 
23213121 )(3
1)(
3
1)(
3
2 qLMPLMPLMPqLMPLMPqLMPLMPqLMPq =−+−+−×+× . This 
FTR portfolio also links G's revenue to 2LMP , which is less volatile than 1LMP . As will be 
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seen later, market participants in practice sometimes purchase more than one single FTR and 
indeed construct FTR portfolios.  
 
Figure 6: Transaction via a pool with congestion: FTR portfolio 
 
Figure 6 gives another example of hedging using an FTR portfolio. Similar to the 
previous examples, G injects q MWs to the power pool and receive payments at its own 
nodal price 1LMP  for each MW injected. Since 1LMP  fluctuates, G may want to hedge 
against the uncertainty using FTRs. Suppose that the LMPs at nodes 2, 3 and 4 change almost 
independently, such that the pairwise correlations between the LMPs at the nodes 2, 3 and 4 
are very small. Let 2nσ  be the variance of the LMP at node n, for 4,3,2,1=n . Then G can 
reduce the price risk by holding a portfolio of FTRs associated with the nodes 2, 3 and 4. Let 
0,, 141312 ≥qqq  be the quantity of MWs that G obtains for the FTR from 1 to 2, from 1 to 3 
and from 1 to 4, respectively and assume that qqqq =++ 141312 . Consequently, G will get 
414313212
1414131312121 )()()(
LMPqLMPqLMPq
qLMPLMPqLMPLMPqLMPLMPqLMP
++=
−+−+−+
 
which is a weighted average of the LMPs of the three nodes. This revenue is still random and 
its variance can be calculated as 
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where 23σ , 24σ  and 34σ  are the pairwise covariances of the LMPs at nodes 2, 3 and 4. The 
second equality holds when the three LMPs are pairwisely uncorrelated. The variance of G's 
revenue in the absence of the FTR portfolio is 
2
1
2
1413121 )()var( σqqqqLMP ++=  
 If 2LMP , 3LMP  and 4LMP  are almost constant, that is, 
2
2σ , 23σ  and 24σ  are nearly 
zero, then 0)var( 414313212 ≈++ LMPqLMPqLMPq and holding the FTRs completely 
eliminates the risk associated with 1LMP . If 2LMP , 3LMP  and 4LMP  are no more volatile 
than 1LMP , that is,  if 
2
1
2
2 σσ ≤ , 2123 σσ ≤  and 2124 σσ ≤ , then 
)var()var( 1414313212 qLMPLMPqLMPqLMPq ≤++  
This relationship may also hold if 2LMP , 3LMP  and 4LMP  are negatively correlated. 
Hence, holding this FTR portfolio lowers G's risk exposure, although the portfolio may not 
completely eliminate the risk. In all, the FTRs provide G with a hedge, but not necessarily a 
perfect one. 
From the above examples, we find that under a bilateral agreement, FTRs together 
with CFDs can always provide a perfect hedge against the price risk and a GENCO ends up 
with a fixed revenue. In comparison, in the absence of bilateral agreements, the resulting 
revenue that a GENCO receives from selling electricity and holding FTRs is usually a 
function of the LMPs. So the revenue may not be fixed and its variability depends on the 
variations of LMPs and their covariances. Under some conditions, this variability of G's 
revenue is less than the one if G does not have FTRs, and FTRs provide a hedge against the 
risk. The hedging functionality of FTRs is similar for LSEs who purchase, rather than sell 
power. In analogy, holding FTRs can also provide a hedge against the volatile revenue of an 
LSE. 
A complete analysis of the hedging or coverage provided by FTRs requires 
knowledge of the power transactions that market participants enter into -- whether it is 
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through bilateral contract or via the power pool. The literature, however, often ignores the 
type of power transactions which motivates the market participants to obtain FTRs and only 
focuses on the random congestion charges. Knowing that the volatility in congestion charges 
comes from the volatility in LMPs which the transactions are based on, most papers conclude 
that a market participant simply has to purchase enough FTRs to hedge its transmission 
congestion exposure perfectly. They regard the congestion charges as the only random 
variables and make their reasoning in this way: since market participants can have these 
charges reimbursed by holding FTRs, FTRs will provide a perfect hedge. This, as can be seen 
from our previous examples, generally does not hold. An agent chooses FTRs to hedge 
against the risk with the LMP exposure, not simply the congestion charges. The FTRs may 
provide a full coverage for the congestion payment but not for the market participant's total 
income from power transactions via the pool. 
4.3.2 Theoretic Framework 
In this subsection, we explore the relationship between the expected congestion 
charge or equivalently the expected revenue from holding an FTR and the agent's willingness 
to pay for that FTR. Two types of risk preference are considered -- risk neutrality and risk 
aversion. For risk-neutral case, we can derive the relationship between the revenue and the 
payment analytically. However, it is much harder to do so for risk-averse case. Alternatively, 
instead of providing a rigorous proof as we did for the risk-neutral case, we will try to 
identify the relationship between the expected congestion revenue and the FTR payment 
through numerical simulation. 
Although from the previous subsection, we know that holding FTRs may not be able 
to eliminate completely the uncertainty with an agent's income in some cases, here we make 
assumption that FTRs will always provide a perfect hedge for our theoretical analysis. That is, 
an agent can make her profit deterministic or free of price risk by holding an FTR. Let w  
denote the non-stochastic total profit of an agent resulting from obtaining an FTR. Then 
without the FTR, the agent's profit is Rw − , where R is the congestion charge (or revenue) 
the agent has to pay and is a random variable. Hence, Rw −  is also a random variable and 
the agent's profit is uncertain. An FTR reimburses the congestion charge R for the agent no 
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matter how much R is. So the expected revenue from holding the FTR is )(RE . As a result, 
owning the FTR locks the agent's profit at w and provides a perfect hedge against the risk. Of 
course the agent has to pay in order to acquire the FTR. We will use F to denote the 
maximum $ amount she is willing to pay for the FTR. 
Consider a risk-neutral agent whose utility function can be expressed as 
( ) ππ baU +=  
where 0>b  and π  is the agent’s profit or payoff. Suppose that the congestion charge R is 
distributed according to a probability density function (PDF) ( )Rf . Then in the absence of 
FTRs, the agent’s profit Rw −=π  is a random variable and her expected utility is given by 
( ) ( )
( )ERwba
dRRfRwUEU
−+=
−= ∫
       
 
If she purchases FTR for $F, her utility will be 
( ) ( )FwbaFwU −+=−  
By certainty equivalence theory, the agent’s willingness to pay (F) for the FTR satisfies 
( )FwUEU −=  
Hence,  
( )REF =                                                                (1) 
which means that a risk-neutral agent is willing to pay up to exactly the expected 
charge/revenue from holding the FTR. Note that the relationship still holds if we divide both 
sides of equation (1) by any positive constant. Choosing the MWs of the FTR as the divisor, 
we then have that the expected congestion revenue of one MW FTR or the expected unit 
revenue (which is equal to the sink LMP less the source LMP) should be equal to the unit 
willingness to pay under risk neutrality. This justifies our use of congestion revenue per MW 
of FTR and the unit price in later analysis, instead of multiplying them by the quantity 
purchased. So if the expected unit revenue is plotted against the unit willingness to pay, it 
should be a 45 degree line if all agents are risk neutral. 
Now consider a risk-averse agent who would be willing to pay extra premium to 
stabilize his profit to a deterministic amount. By certainty equivalence theory, we have the 
following equation: 
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( ) ( )FwURwEU −=−                                                     (2) 
By Jensen’s inequality, it follows that 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )ERwURwEURwEUFwU −=−<−=−                         (3) 
Then it is straightforward that the willingness-to-pay for FTR is always greater than the 
expected value for congestion charge. That is, 
ERF >                                                                    (4) 
This means that a risk-averse agent is willing to pay more than the expected charge or 
revenue from holding the FTR. However, the further relationship between F and ER depends 
not only on the entire distribution of random variable R but also on the utility function ( )⋅U . 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore such relationship in full detail. 
4.4 Data 
Our study focuses on the one-month FTRs that were purchased in the monthly FTR 
auctions in MISO from April 2005 to May 2006. The data we use are obtained from the FTR 
auction results of the twelve months and the historical day-ahead LMP files, which are all 
publicly available in MISO's website. Specifically, the results of each monthly auction 
include, for each FTR, the buyer, the source and sink, the MW amount awarded, the class 
(peak or off-peak), whether it is an obligation or option and the market clearing price 
measured in $/MW32. For each MW of FTR awarded, the buyer must pay the clearing price 
of that FTR, which is determined in the auction for each month t. So the clearing price is 
actually the unit cost of obtaining an FTR. Let nmtF
,  denote the market clearing price of the 
FTR defined from node m to node n for month t, Tt ,...,1= . 
The auction results do not directly report the unit revenue from holding an FTR, that 
is, the congestion rent per MW accumulated from the source to the sink for the effective 
month. Hence in the data pre-processing stage, we calculate the unit revenue using the 
congestion component (MCC) of the day-ahead LMPs, which can be found in the historical 
day-ahead LMP files. For each of the twelve sample months, the historical day-ahead LMP 
dataset includes the MCC of each node for each of the 24 hours in each day of that month. 
                                                 
32 So far, all the FTRs auctioned in MISO are obligations. 
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For example, in April 2005, there are 30 days, each having 24 hours. So, for a node such as 
WPS.PULLIAM3, we have 24×30=720 hourly MCCs. The frame of the hourly MCCs for 
node WPS.PULLIAM3 in April 2005 is given in Table 1 as follows. 
Table 1: Hourly MCCs of node WPS.PULLIAM3 in May 2005 
 
 
The value in each cell in the figure is the MCC of node WPS.PULLIAM3 for the 
corresponding hour h of the corresponding day d in May 2005. For example, the cell 
corresponding to 1=h  and 1=d  is the MCC of node WPS.PULLIAM3 in the first hour on 
May 1, 2005. This table structure applies to all the other nodes in each month of the sample 
period. During the twelve months in our study, the nodes and number of nodes for each 
month stayed the same within that month, but might not, across months. As time went on, 
new nodes were added to MISO's transmission network or some existing nodes were 
removed from it. The number of nodes for each month as well as the change in the number 
from the previous to the current month is given in Table 2. 
 Given the MCC data described above, the revenue that the FTR owner gets for each 
MW of FTR held can be derived as the sum of the difference between the hourly sink and 
source MCCs in the day-ahead market over all hours in the effective month. Let 24,...,1=h  
index the hour, and tDd ,...,1=  index the day, where tD  is the number of days in month t. 
Let nhdtp  be the MCC of node n at hour h on day d in month t. Then 
nm
tR
, , the revenue from 
holding one MW of the FTR from node m to node n during month t can be computed as 
( )∑∑ −=
d h
m
hdt
n
hdt
nm
t ppR
,                                                      (6) 
We can also call nmtR
,  the unit revenue of the FTR from m to n. Note that for peak FTRs, the 
revenues are calculated by aggregating MCC differences in the peak hours; for off-peak 
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FTRs, the MCC differences used in calculating the revenues are all those in the off-peak 
hours. So, in equation (6), the range of d and h over which the MCC difference is aggregated 
depends on whether the FTR is for peak or off-peak hours. 
Table 2: Reported number of nodes in MISO service region (April 2005-March 2006) 
 
 
We notice that in some months, some sources or sinks on which the FTRs were 
defined cannot be found in the list of the day-ahead LMP file of the corresponding months. 
In that case, we are unable to calculate the revenue from holding those FTRs. For example, in 
June 2005, the market participant EMMT bought 5.8 MWs of the FTR from node 
NSP.CHARA6 to node GRE.WILM, but the source node is not found in the LMP file for the 
same month. Such discrepancies occur because the commercial model changed after the FTR 
auction results were finalized. For example, the June 2005 auction was conducted in May 
2005. The June commercial model was propagated into the FTR system after the June 2005 
auction was completed. Sources and sinks on the awarded FTRs were corrected to match the 
updated model, but the auction result report was not updated since it reflected the actual 
outcome from the auction as it was conducted. A snapshot of the most current active FTRs in 
the system is available on the portal, but not currently posted on MISO public website. In our 
analysis, we shall ignore any FTR defined on the "missing" nodes. 
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Table 3: Reported number of distinct FTRs (April 2005-March 2006) 
 
 
Similar to the number of nodes, the number of FTRs purchased in the monthly 
auctions was not the same for each month either. More FTRs were bought in some months 
than others, as is shown in Table 3. Several factors contribute to the fluctuating number of 
the FTRs purchased. As the number of nodes on which FTRs are defined varies across month, 
the change in the FTR purchase number is natural and understandable. For example, if new 
nodes are added to the network, more FTRs will be available, since they can be defined on 
more combinations of nodes. Besides, seasonality may also cause more FTRs to be 
purchased in some months than others. With only one year's data, we cannot tell much about 
the effect of seasonality on the FTRs purchased. A longer sample period for a relatively 
stable transmission network is needed for analyzing the seasonality effect. This will be 
possible for MISO as time goes on. 
Before proceeding, let us introduce some notations for FTR types that is applied 
systematically throughout the rest of this paper. Since all auctioned FTR can be classified as 
either peak or off-peak, and people's purchasing decisions regarding peak and off-peak FTRs 
are expected to be different, we classify our data to two parts: peak and off-peak 
accordingly33. In addition, since there are certain FTRs (defined by point of source and point 
of sink) that are purchased by more than one buyer, and since all of them will receive the 
same prices and congestion rents, we will also distinguish our data between non-distinct and 
                                                 
33 According to MISO (2005a), peak periods are defined as: weekdays, for hours ending 0700 to 2200 hours Eastern 
Standard Time (EST), and excluding North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) holidays. Off-peak periods are 
defined as: weekdays, for hours ending 0100 to 0600 hours EST and hours ending 2300 to 2400 EST, weekends, and NERC 
holidays, for all hours. 
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distinct. The non-distinct data are simply the original data while the distinct data are the data 
where duplicated FTR purchases on the same FTRs are removed. 
By this POND (Peak, Off-peak, Non-distinct, Distinct) classification, we will have 
four different classes of FTRs over the period April 2005 - March 2006. These four classes of 
FTRs are: ON (Off-peak and Non-distinct), OD (Off-peak and Distinct), PN (Peak and Non-
distinct) and PD (Peak and Distinct). All the statistical computations are implemented using 
R34. 
A quick overview of the data gives us some stylized facts of the MISO's FTR market. 
First of all, for all four types of FTRs, the average clearing prices and congestion revenues 
collected are highly volatile across all months. For example, the average clearing price of PD 
FTRs in April 2005 is highly negative (-6313.36), while the value in January 2006 is highly 
positive (960.31). This might be a sign of an immature and unstable new market. The second 
observation is that for most of the FTRs awarded, there was only one buyer for each FTR. In 
other words, the difference between distinct and non-distinct FTRs is not large, which may 
imply that the MISO monthly FTR auction market is quite thin. See Table 4 for reported 
number of non-distinct and distinct FTRs and their difference for the sample period. 
The result from Table 4 indicates that the liquidity of the monthly MISO FTR market 
increases during the one-year period. In April 2005, the market was so illiquid that there 
were only 3 more non-distinct FTRs than distinct FTRs. The overall tendency in the 
difference was increasing as time went on, although the difference in June, September 2005 
and March 2006 decreased from the previous month. These fluctuations may be explained by 
seasonality factors, but we need more information to provide a definite answer. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34 R is an open-source software environment for statistical computing and graphics. More information about R can be found 
at http://www.r-project.org. 
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Table 4: Reported number of non-distinct and distinct FTRs (April 2005-March 2006) 
 
 
4.5 Empirical Methodologies 
4.5.1 Overview 
In this study, the goal is to empirically test the FTR market performance under the 
risk-neutrality assumption. As shown earlier, a risk-neutral agent is willing to pay FTR up to 
his expected congestion revenue accumulated from the source to the sink specified by the 
FTR. Hence, under risk-neutrality, if the market is efficient, the unit cost of purchasing the 
FTR should be an unbiased estimator of the expected unit congestion revenue in the absence 
of interest. The problem is that the agents' expectations are not known and all the data we are 
able to collect are ex post realized value, not ex ante. To proceed, we make the following 
assumptions: (1) For every node, the LMP in each peak hour is independently and identically 
distributed (IID). So is the LMP in each off-peak hour. (2) Each market participant has 
perfect foresight. That is, he knows exactly the distributions of the peak and off-peak hour 
LMPs. Under these assumptions, we can use the realized congestion revenue as a proxy to 
the expected congestion revenue. Furthermore, since only those who are willing to pay more 
than the market clearing price can be cleared (i.e., being awarded some amount of FTR at 
some price), we can use this clearing price to approximate the agent's willingness to pay. 
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Now we are interested in testing if the clearing price of an FTR ($/MWh) effective 
during month t is equal to the expectation of the unit congestion revenue for that FTR. The 
null hypothesis we want to test is 
nm
t
nm
t RFH
,,
0 : =                                                            (7) 
We test this hypothesis via the following regression specification: 
t
nm
t
nm
t FR εββ ++= ,10,                                                      (8) 
In an efficient market with all risk-neutral agents, 0β  and 1β  should be close to 0 and 1, 
respectively. 
In the following subsection, we first discuss briefly the linear regression model to 
estimate Equation (8); then move on to introduce the nonparametric kernel regression model 
to estimate Equation (9). Finally, we carry out a goodness-of-fit test to see if the simple linear 
relationship between expected congestion revenue of FTR and its clearing price could be 
refuted. 
4.5.2 Linear Regression Model 
For simple notation, let x denote the monthly FTR auction clearing price ( nmtF
, ) and y 
denote its associated congestion revenue ( nmtR
, ). Under the usual Gauss-Markov assumptions, 
we can specify the simple linear model as: 
iii xy εββ ++= 10                                                     (10) 
 Under ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation, the estimated coefficients 
^β  are: 
( ) yTT xxx 1−=β                                                       (11) 
where ( )T10  βββ =  and ( )x 1x = . Then the fitted linear function is 
( ) ( ) yxmy TT xxxxx 1^^^ ^ −=== ββ                                     (12) 
4.5.3 Kernel Regression Model 
Under the weaker assumption of IID observations ( ) ( ) 211 ,..., Ryxyx nn ∈ , the general 
nonparametric regression model can be written as: 
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( ) ii xmy ε+=                                                          (13) 
where ( ) ( )xXYExm == |  is the conditional mean function (regression function). This 
conditional mean function ( )⋅m  tells us how y and x are related "on average", which can be 
estimated using modern nonparametric technique such as kernel regression method. The most 
commonly used kernel smoothing estimator for estimating ( )⋅m  is called the Nadaraya-
Watson (NW) estimator, which is given by 
( )
( )
( )hxxn
i
ih
xx
n
i
h
i
i
K
yK
xm
−
=
−
=
∑
∑
=
1
1
^
                                                  (14) 
where ( )⋅K  is the kernel function, which is usually a probability density function, and h is the 
smoothing parameter or bandwidth, which controls the amount of smoothness in the fitted 
density estimate35. The nice structural form of the NW estimator can be derived from the 
definition of the conditional expectation. See Sun (2006) for a detailed treatment. 
4.5.4 Goodness-of-fit Test 
To formally test whether the linear model is adequate enough to explain the 
relationship between expected congestion revenue of FTRs and its clearing price, we use the 
kernel-based nonparametric goodness-of-fit test. The null hypothesis is that the true 
underlying relationship between variable x and y can be represented by function m which is 
characterized by parameter β, that is, 
βmmH =:0   v.s.  βmmH ≠:1  
where ( )xmβ  is some β-parameterized function of x. Let ( )xmh^  denote the NW estimator of 
m(x), and let 
                                                 
35 Technically, a kernel function ( )⋅K  should satisfy the following four conditions: (i) ( )∫ = 1duuK  (pdf), (ii) 
( )∫ = 0duuuK  (symmetry), (iii) ( )∫ >= 022 KduuKu σ  (finite variance), and (iv) ( ) 0≥uK  for all u in the domain of K 
(non-negativity). 
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denote an NW smoothing of ( )xm ^β . Note that ( )xm ^β  is just the parametric estimate of the 
function ( )xmβ . Hardle and Mammen (1993) propose the following test statistic:  
( ) ( ) ( )∫∞
∞−
−= dxxwxmxmnhT hn 2
~^
}{ ^21 β                                     (15) 
For simplicity, let ( ) ( )xfxw =  and 1=d  in this study, and then we can approximate nT  by: 
( ) ( ) 2~
1
^
}{ ^21 xmxmnhT
n
i
hn β∑
=
−≈                                             (16) 
In addition to calculate the test statistic, we need to find its critical value to carry out 
the test. Since the distribution of this test statistic does not fall into any easily-identifiable 
parametric distributions, there are basically two approaches to obtain its critical value -- 
either through asymptotic normality approximation or through bootstrap simulation. Since in 
this case the asymptotic approximation yields a rather inefficient speed of convergence (at 
the rate of 101−n , see Hardle and Mammen (1993) for details procedures in this approach), we 
opt to use the bootstrap approach to obtain the critical value. Furthermore, since naive 
bootstrap (i.e., resampling of ( ){ }niii yx 1** , =  from ( ){ }niii yx 1, =  fails in regression context, we may 
use the wild bootstrap originally introduced by Wu (1986). 
Denote 
^
*
αt  as the critical value, then the bootstrap assisted GOF test for βmmH =:0  
is rejected if 
^
*
αtTn = . Detailed procedures about this approach can be found in Sun (2006). 
4.6 Results 
In this section, we discuss the results of the MISO monthly FTR auctions using the 
data from April 2005 through March 2006. Recall that we classify the FTR data into four 
categories, namely ON, OD, PN and PD. The following results are reported for all these four 
FTR types. First, we present some summary statistics, and calculate the degree to which risk-
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neutral market participants predicted congestion patterns correctly. Second, we use the linear 
model to estimate the effectiveness of FTRs as hedges for transmission congestion. Third, we 
apply non-parametric kernel model to investigate the performance of the FTR market with 
risk-averse agents. Finally, we evaluate the assumption of risk-neutrality using goodness-of-
fit test, and the assumption of risk-aversion using the kernel smoothing method. 
4.6.1 Summary Statistics 
  For each FTR purchase in each monthly auction between April 2005 and March 2006, 
we determine the unit cost of purchasing that FTR and unit revenue from holding it. Based 
on the data, we calculate a set of summary statistics for all the four types of FTRs over the 
entire sample months, and report them in Table 6-936. 
The upper half of Table 6-9 reports the total number of observations and the average 
price and congestion revenues as well as their standard deviations. From the summary result, 
it appears that both the FTR price and congestion revenue are highly volatile, which suggests 
that MISO FTR market is still in its immature stage. It is worth noting that the FTR price can 
be negative. This can be explained as follows. Let node A and node B be the source and sink 
nodes, on which an FTR is defined. Then the agents anticipating congestion from node A to 
node B (hence with positive congestion revenue) would be willing to pay a positive amount 
for this FTR, while those that expect congestion in the opposite direction (hence with 
negative congestion revenue) would be willing to pay a negative amount for this FTR, i.e., 
expecting to get paid for purchasing this FTR. 
As we examine the bottom half of Table 6-9, this relationship between the FTR price 
and congestion revenue is also confirmed by the data. For example, the positive Pearson 
correlation coefficient for each month indicates that F and R move together to some degree. 
Specifically, the average correlation is medium high at 0.54 during the sample period. We 
also calculate and report the number of correct prediction, which is defined as the data point 
where the FTR price F and the congestion revenue R have the same sign. The result shows 
that most market participants predict the congestion directions correctly, as the proportion of 
                                                 
36 We do notice that the summary results for the first month (April 2005) are considerably different from those in the later 
months. 
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the correct predictions in the total number of awarded FTRs is always greater than 50% and 
for some months it is nearly 80%. Furthermore, we examine the number and the percentage 
of the awarded FTRs for which the price paid is lower than the congestion revenue collected. 
We call these FTRs "winners" in the sense that market participants can make positive profit 
from purchasing these FTRs. For all four types of FTRs, the percentage of "winners" is 
relatively high (the mean value for all these winner percentage is 59%). 
4.6.2 Linear Regression Estimation 
We fit the linear regression in (8) for all four types of FTR data for each month. The 
results are summarized in Table 10-13 and also depicted in Figure 10-13. The description of 
the figures is as follows: the brown dotted lines are the zero-zero lines; the red dashed line is 
the 45 degree line; the green line is the linear regression fit; and the blue line is the 
nonparametric kernel fit. 
As in the figures, the results show that every quadrant has some points, although 
some have more points than others. For each month, there are some "wild" points far from 
the origin, and the observations are widely spread. In spite of that, most of the points lie close 
to the zero-price or zero-revenue axis, meaning that the prices and congestion revenues of 
most FTRs are not extremely positive or extremely negative. This is consistent with our 
common sense that most of the time the congestion levels are moderate. 
There is clear evidence that the slope of the regression line is different from one, but 
is always positive, which confirms the positive correlation between the revenue and price37. 
For some months, the slope is greater than one, while for other months, it is lower than one. 
This means that sometimes market participants systematically lose money and sometimes 
systematically earn money when they try to hedge congestion risk exposures. For most of the 
months, the intercept is far away from zero. 
These graphic observations can also be confirmed by the estimated results reported in 
Table 10-13. Clearly the estimated regression coefficients 0β  and 1β  are very different from 
0 and 1, and most of their associated p-values are far less than 0.01. Therefore we can reject 
                                                 
37 There are some cases where the slope is very close to one such as ON FTRs in Oct-05 and Mar-06. 
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the null hypothesis that the MISO FTR market is efficient under the assumption of risk-
neutrality of the market participants. 
Although the results from the linear regression model suggest that the MISO FTR 
market is not efficient under the assumption of risk-neutrality, it can still be true that the 
market is efficient if the market participants are not risk-neutral. We have shown earlier 
through simulation that for risk-averse agents, the efficient relationship between the FTR 
prices and congestion revenues would not be a 45 degree line but rather a concave function. 
In that case, our regression results might well be the signs of the agents being risk averse. To 
take other possible risk preference into account, we apply a nonparametric method, kernel 
regression, to estimate the relationship between FTR price and the congestion revenue. 
4.6.3 Kernel Regression and GOF Test 
As briefly introduced in Section 4.5.3, we applied NW kernel regression to all four 
types of FTR data over 12 months. The fitted kernel line (in blue) appears to be highly non-
linear as they shown in Figure 10-13. Although, due to the noise data, the kernel fit does not 
suggest any plausible non-linear relationship between the FTR price and the congestion 
revenue, we still can use it to construct a goodness-of-fit (GOF) test against the linear model. 
As detailed in Appendix, we choose the bootstrap sample size to be 1000. The GOF test 
result is reported in Table 14. The result shows that all the tests are rejected at significance 
level 0.004 or better, which implies that the underlying relationship between F and R is 
significantly different from the linear fit. 
The linear regression results in the preceding subsection indicate that under the 
assumption of risk-neutrality, the MISO FTR market does not perform efficiently, or 
alternatively the assumption itself is doubtable. The goodness of fit test conducted confirms 
us further that the linear fit is not proper for the data observed. Naturally, we are motivated to 
ask if the market might be efficient in the case of other risk preferences, such as risk-aversion. 
As shown earlier, the only thing we know about the relationship between agent's willingness 
to pay (F) and the expected congestion revenue from holding the FTR (ER) under risk-
aversion assumption is that F>ER. From the estimated kernel regression functions, we 
observe that many fitted kernel curves are above the 45 degree line, which means that the 
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risk "premium" is negative. Therefore, using the kernel fits as exploratory methods for 
examining the validity of the risk-aversion assumption, we may conclude that the market 
participants are not all risk-averse. Equivalently, the MISO FTR market is not efficient 
assuming that risk-aversion. 
4.7 Conclusions 
Some empirical work has been conducted with the existing FTR markets, such as the 
NYISO TCC market, but none has been done to empirically investigate the newly born 
MISO FTR market. In this paper, we examine the performance of this market, using publicly 
available data on the prices paid and congestion revenues collected by the market participants 
in the monthly auctions between April 2005 and March 2006. Our study provides some 
empirical evidence of how this young market has been performing so far. We find that the 
new market has something in common with the mature ones and also possess some unique 
features. The following lists the features that the MISO FTR market and NYISO TCC market 
share: 
1.  The correlation between FTR clearing prices and congestion revenues is positive 
for each month. 
2.   For each month, most of the FTR holders make correct predictions about the 
direction of congestions, that is, the price and revenue have the same sign. 
3.   A considerable portion of FTR holders make money by purchasing the FTRs, that 
is, the clearing price is lower than the revenue collected. 
At the same time, the MISO FTR market has some stylized facts that are not seen in 
the more mature markets: 
1. The number of distinct and non-distinct awards is different for different months, 
but increases over the 12 months on the whole. 
2. The FTR market is quite thin, in the sense that there is only one buyer for most 
FTRs; But the difference between the number of non-distinct FTR awards and the 
number of distinct ones increases, meaning that this market gets thicker over time. 
3. The average FTR auction clearing prices and revenues are very volatile across all 
months. 
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4. The correlation between FTR clearing prices and congestion revenues has a 
slightly increasing trend over the 12 months. 
5. The results for the first month (April 2005) are very different from later months. 
Compared with the first three common features, these five characteristics are 
indicative of this new market, but they could also imply that this market is getting more 
mature as time goes on. If we had a longer sample period, we might be able to see more 
clearly the progressing of this market and differentiate between the trend and seasonality. 
This is a task to be accomplished in the future. 
As to the performance of the MISO FTR market, we find that the market works well 
in terms of some measures such as the proportion of correct predictions. The results from the 
simple linear regression seem to tell us that this market is not efficient under the assumption 
of risk-neutral market participants. These results, however, might indicate that the risk-
neutrality assumption is not valid in the first place. Therefore, we also consider risk-averse 
preferences and applied nonparametric kernel fit to the data. The kernel fit results suggest 
that the MISO FTR market is not efficient under risk-averse assumption either. Moreover we 
carried out a goodness-of-fit test against the linear fit. The test results indicate that comparing 
with the kernel fit, the linear fit is not adequate enough to capture the underlying structure of 
this market. 
Due to lack of more detailed data, such as the bids and offers submitted by the market 
participants, we cannot conclude what causes the potential inefficiency of the market. This 
can be accomplished in the future when more data become available. 
The contributions of this paper are in two-folds. First, this paper explores the newly 
formed MISO FTR market using empirical methods. With the available data, we summarize 
the stylized facts about MISO FTR market and perform market efficiency tests. Second, in 
this paper we conduct theoretic analysis of the hedging role of FTRs and provide reference 
for further empirical analysis once we have access to more data. For example, we point out 
the need to know if a transaction is bilateral or via a pool when examining the risk coverage 
provided by FTRs. Since the data sources we now have do not provide such information, we 
do not differentiate between the two types in our study. We also mention that one should 
consider the FTR purchase in the context of the power transactions in the wholesale 
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electricity market, but we are not able to do this in the current study due to data availability. 
To fully understand the underlying data generating process for the MISO FTR market, both 
FTRs and power transactions need to be considered. 
There can be several extensions to our work. One is to compare the MISO FTR 
market with the more mature markets such as New England and New York FTR markets to 
see exactly what the difference is and why. With data of a longer sample period, we can carry 
out time series analysis and further investigate the development of the young market and see 
if it will become one similar to those long existing ones. Another extension might be to 
analyze FTR auctions together with the electricity transactions and individual behaviors, so 
as to get an integrated view of how FTRs are used to reduce the risk associated with the 
agent's profit. This is quite challenging and requires data not only from the FTR and energy 
market, but also from individual market participants. 
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4.9 Appendices 
Table 5: MISO monthly FTR allocation and auction timeline: August 2005a 
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Table 6: Summary statistics for off-peak and non-distinct (ON) FTRs (Apr05-Mar06) 
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Table 7: Summary statistics for off-peak and distinct (OD) FTRs (Apr05-Mar06) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
124
Table 8: Summary statistics for peak and non-distinct (PN) FTRs (Apr05-Mar06) 
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Table 9: Summary statistics for peak and distinct (PD) FTRs (Apr05-Mar06) 
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Table 10: Linear regression results for off-peak and non-distinct (ON) FTRs (Apr05-Mar06) 
 
 
Table 11: Linear regression results for off-peak and distinct (OD) FTRs (Apr05-Mar06) 
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Table 12: Linear regression results for peak and non-distinct (PN) FTRs (Apr05-Mar06) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 13: Linear regression results for peak and distinct (PD) FTRs (Apr05-Mar06) 
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Table 14: The goodness-of-fit test results for all the four types of FTRs (Apr05-Mar06) 
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Figure 10: Linear and kernel regressions for off-peak and non-distinct (ON) FTRs 
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Figure 11: Linear and kernel regressions for off-peak and distinct (OD) FTRs 
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Figure 12: Linear and kernel regressions for peak and non-distinct (PN) FTRs 
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Figure 13: Linear and kernel regressions for peak and distinct (PD) FTRs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
133
CHAPTER 5.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This dissertation covers our research findings on some issues related to the power 
industry including transmission investment and FTRs. Specifically, Chapters 2 and 3 
investigate the efficiency attribute of transmission investment and the associated cost 
allocation problems, respectively. The performance of FTRs is addressed in Chapter 4.   
In Chapter 2 we clarify the nature of the externality created by loop flows that can 
cause market-based transmission investment to be inefficient. The main conclusion is that 
transmission investment introduces an externality when it affects the flow of power along the 
lines for any given set of injections. It changes a physical aspect of power transmission, i.e. 
the way that electricity is transmitted in the network. As a result, the decentralized outcome 
may diverge from the efficient one. Specifically, the transmission investment purely induced 
by markets will not be optimal from society’s point of view.  
We say that this externality is created by loop flows, because there is no externality 
with transmission investment in a radial network. However, it does not mean that externality 
must exist whenever there are loop flows. Transmission investment that leaves the 
distribution factors unaffected will not cause market failure even in the presence of loop 
flows.  
Our findings in Chapter 2 may promote understanding of transmission investment 
market design. The externality we investigate needs to be considered in defining property 
rights and developing regulation schemes in order to induce optimal investment level in 
transmission expansion. Mitigating market power itself is far from enough. Even if we could 
create perfectly competitive market environments, the outcome might still be in efficient. In 
Chapter 2, we suggest one way to deal with the externality, the optimal Pigouvian tax. An 
alternative is to establish well-defined and enforceable property rights with regard to the 
externality-generating activity. Then the agents themselves would reach an optimal 
agreement on the level of the externality through bargaining. Both options require much 
information, although the latter requires less than the former. In reality, it might be extremely 
hard to get hands on all the information needed. So an immediate extension to our work is to 
come up with a realistic and feasible mechanism that can remedy the externality associated 
with loop flows.  
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Since having markets make optimal transmission investment decisions is an illusion, 
proper regulation policies should be imposed on transmission planning. One of the related 
issues is who should pay for transmission investment or how the costs should be allocated, 
especially in the case that the investment will benefit society as a whole but hurt some agents 
at the same time. Intuitively, those who will gain from the investment should fund the project, 
but that is not all. To ensure that the project will be launched, the potential sufferers need to 
be compensated for their losses. In addition, we need to figure out the concrete amounts of 
payments, or the specific allocation of the transmission investment costs.  
In Chapter 3, we address the problem above, using cooperative game theory. The 
main idea is that each transmission investment cost allocation problem is associated with a 
cooperative game. Then we can apply the solution concepts of cooperative games to the 
formulated game and obtain the allocation rule for the original problem. Three allocation 
rules are defined in Chapter 3, based on the Shapley value, core and nucleolus, respectively. 
Each of them provides a reasonable allocation of transmission investment cost and a 
benchmark of what the proper allocations of an electricity problem should be in theory. The 
allocation methods that are being practiced can be compared with the ideal allocations to see 
how far away they are from each other and how the mechanism in practice can be improved. 
The allocation rules we define can be used to find allocations, as long as we are able to 
compute the gain or loss to each agent brought about by the transmission investment project. 
This is not an easy task, though. Most of the time we can only estimate the expected benefits 
or losses from the investment, because the future use of transmission, load levels and patterns 
are highly uncertain. In that case, the cost allocation will be conducted based on those 
expected figures, instead of the deterministic ones as in the example in Chapter 3.  
In Chapter 4, we conduct both theoretic and empirical studies of FTRs, a topic highly 
related to transmission investment. One of the major goals of this chapter is to make 
improvement over previous empirical work on FTR markets. A common drawback in the 
handful few papers in this area is the weak theoretic framework. Firstly, the authors simplify 
their analysis without even mentioning the underlying assumptions, but their methodologies 
are not proper if those assumptions do not hold. The empirical results are interpreted as if 
those assumptions were valid, which makes their conclusions less convincing. Secondly, the 
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methodology in some of the papers is based on some unproved conjectures. For example, one 
of the papers asserts that for risk-averse agents, the congestion revenue from an FTR is a 
concave function of the price paid for it. Whether this is true has never been shown. Thirdly, 
the general risk hedging theory is directly borrowed for the FTR analysis without considering 
the specific features of the power market. For example, electricity transactions can be made 
via a power pool or according to a bilateral contract, and the hedging of FTR has different 
manifestations in these two types of transactions. None of the existing papers takes this into 
account. In comparison, our paper, in the first place, constructs a more complete and tenable 
theoretic framework than those in the literature. The unproved conjecture is also 
demonstrated in the paper. Besides, we emphasize the importance of understanding the data 
generation process in addition to working with the observations and suggest what other data 
need to be used for a more complete analysis. 
We come up with stylized facts about this young market: the number of FTR awards 
is increasing overtime, the market is rather thin, but has sign of getting thicker, and the FTR 
clearing prices and revenues are highly volatile etc. These features are not observed in the 
more mature market like the NYISO FTR market, and have not been addressed before. We 
also find that the MISO FTR market is not efficient under both risk-neutral in terms of the 
relationship between the payment and revenue.  
This dissertation addresses some open questions that the U.S. power industry faces 
and elucidates our ideas about them. This does not end the debate on the issues and further 
investigations may be well needed. Besides, many other issues should also be explored in the 
future. We hope to proceed with efforts in the research of the power industry and make our 
contributions to its development. 
 
